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PRO SE CRIMINAL TRIALS AND THE MERGING OF
INQUISITORIAL AND ADVERSARIAL SYSTEMS OF
JUSTICE
Sharon Finegan+
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the constitutional
basis for the highly criticized right of a criminal defendant to represent
himself I The Court, however, has yet to address a critical gap in its self-
representation jurisprudence. Although the Court has provided guidance on
how to determine whether a defendant is capable of exercising the right to
represent himself it has been silent on how a trial should be conducted when a
2defendant chooses to do so. The narrow focus on competency is misplaced.
Indeed, in focusing only on competence, the Court seems to assume that trials
with pro se defendants will be conducted in the same manner as trials where
defendants are represented by counsel. This assumption, however, is not
always correct.
Pro se criminal trials have evolved into a distinct type of trial with distinct
procedures to ensure the fairness of the proceedings. Interestingly, in some
pro se criminal proceedings, courts have adopted characteristics resembling
those utilized in inquisitorial systems of justice that feature prominently in
international law. Thus, in order to ensure the fairness and accuracy of the
verdict in pro se criminal cases, courts have taken a more active role in the
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Maxine Goodman, Adam Gershowitz, Kim Chanbonpin, and Mark Niles for their comments and
support. Finally, I wish to thank the organizers of and participants in the SEALS New Scholars
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1. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2388 (2008). For criticism of the right to self-
representation, see, for example, United States v. Egwaoje, 335 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2003), petition
for cert. filed, 2003 WL 22697568 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2003) (No. 03-691) (seeking reversal of Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 958 (2004); United States v. Farhad,
190 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially); Robert E. Toone, The
Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 621, 628 (2005). Many have urged the
Supreme Court to recognize the fundamental practical problems presented by this right and
overrule Faretta v. California. John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in
the Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 498 (1996).
Throughout this Article, I refer to a defendant's right to represent "himself." This language is
not intended to identify only male defendants, but reflects a desire for consistency and the reality
that the majority of criminal defendants are male. See HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2007 1 tbl. 1 (2008).
2. See Decker, supra note 1, at 488-89.
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proceedings and have relaxed strict procedural rules, mimicking procedures in
civil law countries.
This Article argues that this evolution of the pro se adversarial criminal trial
should be taken one step further. Specifically, procedures should be
consistently adopted to encourage the use of these inquisitorial practices to
ensure the fairness of pro se criminal proceedings. As criminal law becomes
increasingly international in nature, it is fitting that problems presented by pro
se criminal defendants in an adversarial system may be best resolved by
adopting procedures resembling those utilized in inquisitorial trials.
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Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, defendants
have the right to be represented by counsel in criminal actions and will be
appointed counsel in criminal felony prosecutions.3  The right to counsel
comports with American concerns regarding procedural fairness in criminal
trials and the expertise required to ensure that a criminal trial properly adheres
to constitutional procedural requirements. However, in Faretta v. California,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution
also contains a corollary right: that of a criminal defendant to represent himself
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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at trial.4  While the Supreme Court has noted that the right to self-
representation is a qualified right, the elevation of this proposition to
constitutional status represents a manifestation of the American ideal of
autonomy-that a criminal defendant should be able to conduct his own
defense in a court of law.
5
In practice, the right of a criminal defendant to represent himself in court in
many ways conflicts with the uniquely American focus on procedural fairness
and, indeed, the adversarial process generally. Although the right to self-
representation is not a right universally guaranteed in countries outside of the
United States, in practice the right is tied in various ways to international
norms and global concerns.
6
While the right to self-representation is a unique characteristic of the
adversarial system, the ability of a defendant to represent himself has created
numerous problems relating to the fundamental fairness of adversarial trials.
Thus, it is fitting that, in addressing these problems, some courts have adopted
procedures and practices that are not typical of an adversarial system.7  In
order to ensure the fairness of the trial and the accuracy of the verdict, some
courts have asserted greater control over the proceedings and relaxed strict
procedural and evidentiary requirements. 8 In this way, pro se criminal trials in
the United States can begin to look more like inquisitorial proceedings.
As criminal law becomes increasingly internationalized, with criminal
tribunals created to address criminal activity on an international scale and
4. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
5. The United States is one of many countries in the world that has laws or a constitution
allowing for self-representation. In other countries, however, the right to represent oneself
"complements the right to counsel and is not meant as a substitute thereof. This right assures the
accused of the right to participate in his or her defense, including directing the defense, rejecting
appointed counsel, and conducting his or her own defense under certain circumstances." M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifjying International
Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 235, 283 (1993).
Bassiouni further notes that
[t]he right to self-representation is guaranteed by the ICCPR, the Fundamental
Freedoms, the AMCHR, and possibly the Banjul Charter. This right is also guaranteed
in thirty-three of the national constitutions surveyed. In addition, more than sixty-five
constitutions contain language pertaining to the right of defense which may also be
intended to encompass the right to self-representation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Britain and the United States both allow for self-representation, but unlike these two countries,
"most countries of the world do not allow criminal defendants to represent themselves under any
circumstances, and this has been confirmed by the bodies that administer the European human
rights system." See Michael P. Scharf, ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision on Slobodan
Milosevic's Right of Self-Representation, ASIL INSIGHTS, Nov. 2004, http://www.asil.org/insight
04111 l.cfm.
6. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 283.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See infra Part III.B.
2009]
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national courts addressing more and more criminal activity with an
international component, it is not surprising that judicial systems have begun to
adopt procedures used by different countries to address problems not easily
resolved by their own practices. By looking to inquisitorial systems of justice,
and borrowing practices that allow for greater participation of the judge and
more relaxed procedural rules in trials in which a defendant represents himself,
the American adversarial system of justice would help to ensure that the
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to represent himself does not
undermine his fundamental right to a fair trial.
Part I of this Article looks at the history of the right to self-representation in
the United States and the evolution of this doctrine. Part II compares the
American adversarial system with the French inquisitorial system, and
describes the distinct characteristics of each. Part III of this Article discusses
some of the problems associated with pro se criminal proceedings and how an
adversarial trial involving a pro se defendant can take on characteristics
resembling that of an inquisitorial trial. Part IV examines how pro se criminal
proceedings outside of the United States have faced problems similar to those
in American criminal trials in which a defendant represents himself. Finally,
Part V of this Article argues that courts can go one step further, and
recommends the consistent use of inquisitorial procedures to better ensure a
fair result in pro se criminal trials.
I. THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES
In order to ensure the fairness of criminal proceedings, the U.S. Constitution
provides defendants with certain protections, guaranteeing the right to a fair
trial. 9 One of those protections is the right to an attorney to act on behalf of the
defendant in criminal proceedings and to ensure that the defendant's rights are
protected. 10 When a defendant is not represented by an effective attorney, his
rights may not be adequately protected and the fairness of the proceedings may
be questioned.11 Thus, the right to counsel has been heralded as one of the
guarantors of a fair trial in the United States. However, despite the recognized
importance of the right to counsel, the Supreme Court has held that there is a
corollary right-one permitting a criminal defendant to represent himself.12
Thus, unlike in many civil law inquisitorial systems of justice, where a
defendant must be represented by counsel, in the American adversarial system
a defendant can choose to proceed without the assistance of an attorney. 3 In
order to explain how these two seemingly contradictory constitutional rights
coexist, this Part first looks at the history of the right to counsel in the United
9. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
12. Faretta v. Califomia, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
13. See infra Part II.B.4.
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States. Next, this Part examines the right to self-representation and recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence that has limited this right in some ways. In
subsequent Parts, this Article will examine how trials in which a defendant
chooses to exercise his right to self-representation begin to resemble
inquisitorial proceedings and why this development has occurred.
A. History of the Right to Counsel in the United States
To fully understand the origins of the right to self-representation, one needs
to first look at the history of the right to counsel in the United States. The right
to counsel for serious offenses was not a right under English common law that
the early American colonists brought with them to the New World. 14 Prior to
the American Revolution, the American colonies varied in the statutory rights
granted to colonists, and therefore it is impossible to make a blanket assertion
about the right to counsel in the colonies as a whole. 15 However, it is clear that
in several colonies the right to counsel was granted to defendants either in
practice or by statute.' 6 This difference between colonial law and English law
was based on many factors. First, traditional English criminal law did not
contemplate the use of a public prosecutor, but was rather an accusatorial
system in which the victim often represented himself in court.17 On the other
hand, "by the time of the American Revolution all of the colonies employed
professionally trained and state-funded lawyers to pursue criminal charges."'
' 8
14. JAMES J. TOMKOvICz, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 1-2 (Jack Stark
ed., 2002) (explaining that England only afforded defendants the right to counsel in minor cases
because the monarchy "fear[ed] that lawyers would prevent the successful prosecution and
punishment of those whose acts most threatened the state's survival").
Indeed, a felon's ability to be represented by counsel was not permitted by English Parliament
until 1836, well after the American Constitutional Convention and adoption of the Sixth
Amendment. WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-9 (Univ.
of Mich. Press 1955) (noting that before 1836, treason was the only felony for which a defendant
was appointed counsel). "Until the middle of the eighteenth century, the British courts strictly
adhered to a common law rule that prohibited those accused of [murder, manslaughter, larceny,
robbery, rape, or treason or misprision of treason] from employing lawyers to assist in their
defense." TOMKOVICZ, supra, at 3. This rule prohibiting the representation of defense counsel
was first modified by the Treason Act of 1695, which allowed for a defendant to be represented
by counsel in a trial for treason. Trial in Treason Act, 1695, 7 Will. 3, ch. 3 (Eng.). Subsequent
to the Treason Act, judges began to use their discretion to allow some defendants to be
represented by counsel in court. TOMKOVICZ, supra, at 6. Note that these advancements did not
allow for the appointment of counsel, but rather were limits on the prohibition of counsel in
serious cases. See id. at 6-8.
15. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 14, at 11-13.
16. See id. at 11-12. A survey of early colonial practices by William Beaney indicates that
Connecticut afforded counsel in practice, if not by statute, until 1818 when the state constitution
was adopted. Pennsylvania, Delaware, and South Carolina statutorily granted criminal
defendants the right to counsel in capital cases, while the practice in Virginia and Rhode Island
was essentially the same as that in England. See BEANEY, supra note 14, at 15-18.
17. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 14, at 9.
18. Id.
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This led to a disparity in power between the prosecution and defendant which
necessitated the use of professional defense attorneys. Further, the number of
lawyers in the colonies was rapidly rising, making the employment of defense
attorneys logistically possible in criminal actions.' 9  In addition, "colonists
came to recognize the critical roles that counsel could play in protecting
individual rights and liberties against oppressive or overreaching government
authorities.
Over time, jurisprudence governing the right to counsel developed
significantly and the right expanded from allowing counsel to appear on a
defendant's behalf to appointing counsel for indigent defendants in federal
criminal prosecutions. 2 1 The right to counsel was further expanded by the
Supreme Court in 1932 with the landmark case of Powell v. Alabama. In
Powell, the Supreme Court held that when a defendant is unable to employ
counsel and make his own defense, counsel must be assigned in a capital case,
23regardless of whether that case is in state or federal court. As commentators
19. Id.
20. Id. at 10. Justice Sutherland wrote for the Court in Powell that "[i]t thus appears that in
at least twelve of the thirteen colonies the rule of the English common law, in the respect now
under consideration, had been definitely rejected and the right to counsel fully recognized in all
criminal prosecutions." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1932).
21. Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel
Doctrine, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1635, 1640-41 (2003).
22. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Powell involved the trial and conviction of three young African
American men for the rape of two white women in Alabama. Id. at 49-50. The three defendants
were appointed counsel the day of trial, and each defendant was tried separately and convicted
within that same day. Id. at 50, 56. The Alabama Supreme Court held that this procedure
complied with the state constitution's right to counsel. Id. at 59-60. The Supreme Court of the
United States held that, although such procedures might comply with the state statutory and
constitutional right to counsel, the Constitution of the United States applied, and demanded far
more than was afforded to the defendants in this case. Id. at 71-72. For the story in Powell that
does not appear in the Court's opinion, see Michael J. Klarman, Powell v. Alabama: The Supreme
Court Confronts "Legal Lynchings ", in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES I (Carol S. Steiker ed.,
2006).
23. Powell, 287 U.S. at 72-73. The Powell Court focused on the specific facts of the case,
including
the ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public
hostility, the imprisonment and the close surveillance of the defendants by the military
forces, the fact that their friends and families were all in other states and
communication with them necessarily difficult, and above all that they stood in deadly
peril of their lives ....
Id. at 71.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), severely limited the holding in Powell, stating that the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution did not incorporate the right to counsel,
id. at 461-62, and so states had no constitutional requirement to supply counsel for defendants
except in special circumstances such as those presented in Powell, id. at 462-65, 471-73. The
Betts Court quoted this language from Powell specifically:
"All that is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that, in a capital case, where
the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his
[Vol. 58:445
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have pointed out, the Powell Court's holding relied on the adversarial nature of
the American criminal justice system, and noted that an adversarial system
depends on effective assistance of counsel protecting the interests of the
defendant. 24 Justice Sutherland stated in his opinion:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good
or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence.2 5
Subsequent Supreme Court rulings determined that the right to counsel
applied in all federal criminal proceedings in which a defendant was at risk of
losing his life or liberty. 26 Finally, in 1963, the Supreme Court decided Gideon
v. Wainwright,27 holding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the right
to counsel of the Sixth Amendment, and defendants therefore have the
28constitutional right to counsel in state prosecutions. The Court noted that "a
provision of the Bill of Rights which is fundamental and essential to a fair trial
is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment," and
concluded that the right to counsel is such a fundamental right. 29 Further cases
established at what point the right to counsel attaches for a criminal defendant
and at what proceedings the presence of counsel is constitutionally required.3 °
own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the
duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law ...."
Id. at 463-64 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 71).
24. See Metzger, supra note 21, at 1643 ("Powell's holding, which required a meaningful
appointment of counsel, was based upon a profound commitment to fairness in the adversarial
system.").
25. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
26. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Further, in Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3
(1954), the Court held that a defendant had an unqualified "right to be heard through his own
counsel," id. at 9.
27. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
28. Id. at 339. In so holding, the Supreme Court expressly overruled its previous decision in
Betts. Id.
29. Id. at 342 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (holding that counsel is only
required when a defendant is entitled to be present at that proceeding); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 690 (1972) (creating the "critical stage doctrine," which affords a defendant counsel after the
commencement of formal adversarial criminal proceedings); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137
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Thus, although the right to counsel in the United States has not been as
expansive or zealously guarded in past centuries as it is today, the Supreme
Court has focused increasingly on the right in the twentieth century. Indeed,
the Court has gone beyond requiring the mere presence of counsel in the
courtroom, and has mandated that the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment be "effective," underscoring the importance of the right to
competent representation in criminal proceedings.
31
The Court and scholars have focused on the adversarial nature of criminal
proceedings, and the need to rely on lawyers to protect the rights of defendants
in light of this system.32  As Justice Sutherland's quote from Powell
demonstrates, the Court has seriously doubted the ability of a layperson to
adequately conduct his own defense in a criminal proceeding. 33 Further, if a
defendant cannot be adequately represented in court, the entire adversarial
system is unable to work justly or fairly.34  This might lead one to the
inevitable conclusion that, in the United States, a criminal defendant must be
represented in court by counsel, at least in felony cases and adversarial
proceedings. However, this is not the case-defendants in the United States
also have a constitutional right to waive counsel and represent themselves. But
how can such a right be justified in light of the adversarial nature of the
American criminal justice system? And how do proceedings involving self-
represented defendants operate in practice?
B. Evolution of the Right to Self-Representation in the United States
While a defendant has had the ability to represent himself in court since
colonial times, the Supreme Court did not declare the right to be of
constitutional magnitude until the 1975 decision of Faretta v. California.35
Since the Faretta decision, the Supreme Court has addressed several cases
dealing with the right to self-representation. In those decisions, the Supreme
Court has examined a defendant's competency to assert the right to represent
himself, and has limited the right in some respects. But the Court has never
clearly examined what happens in a criminal trial when a defendant proceeds
pro se, nor has it directly addressed whether the right to self-representation
undermines the fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings.
(1967) (holding that defendants have the right to counsel at sentencing); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967) (holding that the right to counsel attaches at pretrial proceedings
when counsel is necessary to ensure a fair trial).
31. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970).
32. See ToMKovIcz, supra note 14, at 47 ("Proponents of the adversary system hold it as an
article of faith that when the state accuses one of its citizens of a criminal offense, a contest
between committed opponents is the method that will most accurately and reliably determine the
merits of that accusation.").
33. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
34. See id. at 71-72.
35. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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Because the right to counsel is so important in an adversarial system of
justice, when a defendant represents himself in a criminal proceeding without
the assistance of counsel, numerous problems may arise to undermine the
faimess of the proceedings. To compensate for that lack of fairness, some
judges have adopted procedures that help to ensure the fairness of the
proceedings and the accuracy of the verdict. 36 These changes transform the
criminal trial and cause the proceedings to take on characteristics resembling
those used in inquisitorial systems of justice. In order to understand why this
occurs, one must first understand the history of the right to self-representation,
and the narrow focus of the jurisprudence that has defined the right.
This Part explores the Court's jurisprudence examining the right to self-
representation. The following Parts examine the problems that occur in
criminal trials in which a defendant represents himself, and how judges attempt
to compensate for the lack of counsel by adopting procedures that mimic those
used in inquisitorial systems of justice.
American defendants have had the right to represent themselves in court
since colonial times, and Supreme Court jurisprudence originally revolved
around preserving the defendant's autonomy or the circumstances when the
defendant waives counsel. Indeed, the norm in early American colonies was
self-representation, not representation by counsel.3 7  Some early state
constitutional provisions expressly provided for the right to self-representation,
but even absent such provision, no state expressly precluded a defendant from
being able to represent himself in court.38 In 1942, Justice Frankfurter wrote
the majority opinion for Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, in which he
noted that "an accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice, and with
the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by jury, and so likewise
may he competently and intelligently waive his Constitutional right to
assistance of counsel. ' '39  In Adams, the Court dealt specifically with a
defendant who, while representing himself, waived his right to a jury trial.4°
The defendant's lawyer on appeal, and the dissenting Justices, argued that the
right to a jury trial cannot be competently waived without advice of counsel.4 I
36. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, REVISED PRO SE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 4-5 (2002),
http://www.ajs.org/prose/pdfs/Policy%20Recom.pdf (noting that "[m]any judges currently use
individual strategies for handling pro se litigants, but there appears to be no uniformity").
37. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 14, at 14.
38. See id.
39. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942).
40. Id. at 270-71. Writing on the right of an accused to waive counsel, Justice Frankfurter
noted that "[t]here is nothing in the Constitution to prevent an accused from choosing to have his
fate tried before a judge without a jury even though, in deciding what is best for himself, he
follows the guidance of his own wisdom and not that of a lawyer." Id. at 275.
41. See id at 282 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("It would be unlikely that a layman without the
benefit of legal advice would understand the limited nature of the defenses available under [the
mail fraud] statute or the scope of the ultimate issues on which the question of guilt usually turns.
Catholic University Law Review
The majority in Adams focused on general principles of autonomy as the
rationale for not imposing counsel on an accused in such circumstances. In the
opinion, Justice Frankfurter eloquently addressed the autonomy interests of the
defendant:
When the administration of the criminal law in the federal court is
hedged about as it is by the Constitutional safeguards for the
protection of an accused, to deny him in the exercise of his free
choice the right to dispense with some of these safeguards ... and to
base such denial on an arbitrary rule that a man cannot choose to
conduct his defense before a judge rather than a jury unless, against
his will, he has a lawyer to advise him, although he reasonably
deems himself the best advisor for his own needs, is to imprison a
42man in his privileges and call it the Constitution.
The Court acknowledged that a defendant may not be the one most able to
effectively present his case at trial, but indicated that the autonomy interests of
the accused overrode these fairness concerns:
The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to
dispense with a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms. . . . The
public conscience must be satisfied that fairness dominates the
administration of justice. . . . Essential fairness is lacking if an
accused cannot put his case effectively in court. But the Constitution
does not force a lawyer upon a defendant. He may waive his
Constitutional right to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is
43doing and his choice is made with eyes open.
Thus, the Adams Court clearly recognized that the fairness of adversarial
proceedings may be compromised when the defendant chooses to represent
himself. However, the Court was more concerned with protecting the
defendant's autonomy interests from interference by the imposition of an
unwanted lawyer.
In subsequent cases the Supreme Court noted the right of a defendant to
waive counsel, and focused on the content of the waiver and whether that
waiver was intelligent and voluntary. 44 These cases often involved a defendant
who was unrepresented by counsel and whom the government claimed had
Without that understanding I do not see how an intelligent choice between trial by judge or trial
by jury could be made.").
42. Id at 280 (majority opinion).
43. Id. at 279.
44. See, e.g., Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 729 (1948) (noting that an accused has
the right to waive counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, but that "[tihere must be both the
capacity to make an understanding choice and an absence of subverting factors so that the choice
is clearly free and responsible").
[Vol. 58:445
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waived counsel.45 For example, in Rice v. Olson, the Court noted that a plea of
46guilty alone cannot be an absolute and final waiver of the right to counsel .
Because of the nature of these early cases, and their focus on the defendant's
competency to waive counsel, the actual right of a defendant to represent
himself in court was not at the core of these opinions. Rather, the Court
focused on the right of a defendant to be represented by counsel and the strict
standards by which a defendant's waiver of his constitutional rights must be
scrutinized.
Indeed, the Supreme Court did not explicitly hold that there is a
constitutional right to self-re presentation enshrined in the Sixth Amendment
until Faretta v. California.' Faretta departed from past cases in two
significant respects. First, as the Court noted, the question before it in Faretta
was "whether a State may constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts
and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that he wants to
conduct his own defense. 48 Thus, whereas previous Supreme Court decisions
focused on the principle that "the Constitution [itself] does not force a lawyer
upon a defendant,"49 Faretta focused on whether the Constitution also forbade
states from forcing counsel on an unwilling defendant. 50 Second, Faretta is
distinguishable from previous Supreme Court cases because the Court's
concern was "with an independent right of self-representation., 51 As the Court
noted: "We do not suggest that this right arises mechanically from a
defendant's power to waive the right to the assistance of counsel. On the
contrary, the right must be independently found in the structure and history of
the constitutional text."52 Thus, the Court in Faretta determined whether there
is an actual constitutional right to self-representation found in the Sixth
Amendment, and not merely the ability of a defendant to waive the
constitutional right to counsel if he did so knowingly and intelligently.53
45. See, e.g., Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 177 (1946) ("A fair reading of the judgment
against Carter indicates a judicial attestation that the accused, with his rights fully explained to
him, consciously chose to dispense with counsel.").
46. See Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788 (1945) (noting that the lower court's finding that a
plea of guilty 'absolutely' and finally waives" the right to counsel "is inconsistent with [the
Supreme Court's] interpretation of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment").
47. 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
48. Id. at 807.
49. Id. at 814-15 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
50. See id. at 814-15, 817.
51. Id. at 819-20 n.15.
52. Id. at 820 n. 15 (citation omitted).
53. Id. In questioning Faretta, the trial court determined that he "had once represented
himself in a criminal prosecution, that he had a high school education, and that he did not want to
be represented by the public defender because he believed that that office was 'very loaded down
with.., a heavy case load."' Id. at 807 (omission in original).
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The Supreme Court noted that previously the federal government had
statutorily guaranteed the right to self-representation, and that the majority of
state constitutions explicitly granted this right. 54  The Court then noted the
"nearly universal conviction, on the part of our people as well as our courts,
that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right
to defend himself if he truly wants to do so." 55 In so holding, the Court looked
to both the language of the Sixth Amendment and the history of self-
representation in the adversarial systems of England and the United States.56
A major criticism of the right to self-representation is that it does not square
with the adversarial nature of the American criminal justice system. The Court
addressed this issue by noting that the Sixth Amendment "constitutionalizes
the right in an adversary criminal trial to make a defense as we know it.' '57 Yet
the Court also noted that the language of the Sixth Amendment, and the rights
guaranteed by the Amendment, were afforded to the defendant in a criminal
trial, not to counsel for the defendant.
58
In addition to looking at the language of the Constitution, the Supreme Court
also examined British and American legal history and concluded that the
ability of a criminal defendant to represent himself in court had a longstanding
tradition in both English and colonial courts.59
In its opinion, the Court directly addressed the conflict presented by
previous decisions-stressing the necessity of a criminal defendant to be aided
by effective counsel-and a decision that would allow a defendant to represent
himself, regardless of how ineffective such representation might be.60 Like in
54. ld. at 812-13 & n.10.
55. Id. at 817.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 818.
58. See id. at 819. The Court noted that
[i]t is the accused, not counsel, who must be "informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation," who must be "confronted with the witnesses against him," and who must
be accorded "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Although not
stated in the Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representation-to make
one's own defense personally-is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the
Amendment.
Id.
59. See id at 822-32. The Court noted that the use of counsel by defendants in early
English criminal courts was the exception, and not the rule. Id. at 823. Even when reforms
guaranteed some English criminal defendants the right to counsel, the court noted that "[alt no
point in this process of reform in England was counsel ever forced upon the defendant." Id. at
825-26. Further, the Court observed that, while "[c]olonial judges soon departed from ancient
English practice and allowed accused felons the aid of counsel for their defense[,] ... the basic
right of self-representation was never questioned." Id. at 827-28 (footnote omitted). Indeed, the
Court was unable to find any "instance where a colonial court required a defendant in a criminal
case to accept as his representative an unwanted lawyer." Id. at 828.
60. Id. at 832 ("There can be no blinking the fact that the right of an accused to conduct his
own defense seems to cut against the grain of this Court's decisions holding that the Constitution
[Vol. 58:445
2009] Procedures to Ensure Fairness in Pro Se Criminal Trials 457
Adams, the Court weighed the interest of autonomy against the interest of an
effective and efficient trial, and again the Court held that the autonomy interest
of a defendant won out: "although [a defendant] may conduct his own defense
ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of 'that respect
for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law."' 61 Further, the Court
addressed the possibility, however remote, that a criminal defendant might be
able to better represent himself than an attorney would.62
Finally, the Supreme Court held that a court must ensure that a defendant's
waiver of counsel is voluntary and knowledgeable, by making him "aware of
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will
establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes
open. ' ' 63  However, the Court explicitly held that such knowledge and
voluntariness is not contradicted by a lack of "technical legal knowledge," and
therefore a defendant's knowledge of the law or procedural rules is irrelevant
to determining whether the exercise of his constitutional right to self-
representation is permissible.
64
In addition to arguing there was no constitutional language, legal precedent,
or history on which to base a constitutional right to self-representation, both
Chief Justice Burger's and Justice Blackmun's dissents in Faretta focused on
the almost certain inability of the lay defendant to effectively represent
himself. Chief Justice Burger underscored the unfairness that would ensue
from self-representation in the American adversarial system.
Although we have adopted an adversary system of criminal justice
the prosecution is more than an ordinary litigant, and the trial judge
is not simply an automaton who insures that technical rules are
adhered to. Both are charged with the duty of insuring that justice, in
the broadest sense of that term, is achieved in every criminal trial.
That goal is ill-served, and the integrity of and public confidence in
the system are undermined, when an easy conviction is obtained due
to the defendant's ill-advised decision to waive counsel.65
requires that no accused can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to
the assistance of counsel.").
61. Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)). The Founders, in framing the Sixth Amendment, appreciated the "value of state-
appointed counsel," but "the notion of compulsory counsel was utterly foreign to them." Id. at
833. Thus, the Court concluded that "whatever else may be said of those who wrote the Bill of
Rights, surely there can be no doubt that they understood the inestimable worth of free choice."
Id. at 833-34.
62. Id. at 834. In so holding, the Court wrote that "[p]ersonal liberties are not rooted in the
law of averages." Id
63. Id. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 270, 279 (1942)).
64. Id. at 835-36.
65. Id. at 839 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Thus, as Chief Justice Burger noted, the fairness of criminal proceedings may
be jeopardized if an ordinary adversarial criminal trial is used in the case of a
pro se defendant.
66
Since Faretta, the Supreme Court has examined the right to self-
67representation in several cases, most recently in Indiana v. Edwards.
Although the post-Faretta decisions have limited the right to self-
representation in certain respects, the Court has consistently reaffirmed the
right as a constitutional guarantee.
Less than ten years after Faretta, the Supreme Court was confronted with a
case involving one of the difficulties the right to self-representation presents in
practice. In McKaskle v. Wiggins, the trial court appointed standby counsel
over the objection of the defendant, who expressed a desire to represent
himself.68 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court, holding that the defendant's constitutional right to represent
himself had been violated by "the unsolicited participation of overzealous
standby counsel. '69 The Supreme Court held that the appointment of standby
counsel over the objection of a pro se defendant does not violate the
constitutional right to self-representation. v In so holding, the Court clarified
the rationale for allowing a defendant to proceed without counsel, noting that
"[t]he right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the
66. Id. at 838-39.
In his dissent in Faretta, Justice Blackmun enumerated a lengthy list of problems and
questions posed by the ruling that would need to be solved by the courts:
Must every defendant be advised of his right to proceed pro se? If so, when must that
notice be given? Since the right to assistance of counsel and the right to self-
representation are mutually exclusive, how is the waiver of each right to be measured?
If a defendant has elected to exercise his right to proceed pro se, does he still have a
constitutional right to assistance of standby counsel? How soon in the criminal
proceeding must a defendant decide between proceeding by counsel or pro se? Must
he be allowed to switch in midtrial? May a violation of the right to self-representation
ever be harmless error? Must the trial court treat the pro se defendant differently than it
would professional counsel?
Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). And indeed, since the Supreme Court's holding in Faretta,
a vast jurisprudence has been created to deal with the very questions Justice Blackmun asked. A
significant number of cases post-Faretta deal with the adequacy of the "Faretta warnings" given
to defendants, the timing of such warnings, and the competency of a defendant to invoke his right
to self-representation. E.g., Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2383 (2008); Iowa v. Tovar,
541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 170 (1984).
67. 128 S. Ct. at 2388 (explicitly declining to overrule Faretta).
68. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 170-72. In fact, the defendant was inconsistent in his rejection
of the appointment of standby counsel. Id. at 171. At times the defendant relied on the advice of
his attorneys and sought out their assistance. Id. At other times, he rejected the advice of counsel
and objected to their presence at counsel's table. Id. at 171-72.
69. Id. at 173.
70. Id.
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accused and to allow the presentation of what may, at least occasionally, be the
accused's best possible defense."
7 1
In support of its holding that a trial court may appoint standby counsel over
the objection of the defendant, the Supreme Court discussed the many ways in
which a defendant's control over his own case is limited by other actors in the
courtroom:
A pro se defendant must generally accept any unsolicited help or
hindrance that may come from the judge who chooses to call and
question witnesses, from the prosecutor who faithfully exercises his
duty to present evidence favorable to the defense, from the plural
voices speaking "for the defense" in a trial of more than one
defendant, or from an amicus counsel appointed to assist the court.
72
Further, the Court approved the use of standby counsel by noting that it can
"relieve the judge of the need to explain and enforce basic rules of courtroom
protocol or to assist the defendant in overcoming routine obstacles that stand in
the way of the defendant's achievement of his own clearly indicated goals.,
73
Thus, while not directly addressing the issue, the Court seemed to
acknowledge that a trial judge may be much more involved in the proceedings
in the trial of a pro se defendant-actively engaging in questioning and
assisting the defendant with achieving his goals. Yet at the same time the
Court wrote that the Constitution does not "require judges to take over chores
for a pro se defendant that would normally be attended to by trained counsel as
a matter of course." 74 Thus, while not addressed by the Court directly, this
early decision exploring the right to self-representation demonstrates the
conflict between the American adversarial ideal of a judge as a neutral arbiter
and the practical problems imposed when a defendant proceeds pro se.
However, despite the problems presented by this right, the McKaskle Court
reaffirmed the ability of a defendant to proceed pro se, albeit with the possible
presence of standby counsel.
Less than a decade after McKaskle, the Supreme Court again was presented
with a case involving a defendant's right to represent himself. In Godinez v.
Moran, the Court examined the competence necessary for a defendant to waive
the right to an attomey. In Godinez, the defendant elected to represent
71. Id. at 176-77. The Court recognized some limitations on the participation of standby
counsel, indicating that standby counsel may not interfere with the defendant's actual control over
his defense and that the jury must perceive that the defendant is representing himself. Id. at 177-
78.
72. Id. at 177 n.7 (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 184.
74. Id. at 183-84 (also noting that "[a] defendant does not have a constitutional right to
receive personal instruction from the trial judge on courtroom procedure"). The dissent agreed
with the majority opinion in the premise that "the trial judge himself should not be burdened with
educating the defendant in trial procedure and that he should be able to insist that the defendant
learn what he needs to know from standby counsel." Id. at 192-93 (White, J., dissenting).
75. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 391 (1993).
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himself, and pleaded guilty.76  Because the lower court found that the
defendant was competent to stand trial, he was therefore competent to waive
counsel and plead guilty.77 However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that "[c]ompetency to waive constitutional rights ... requires a higher level of
mental functioning than that required to stand trial" and provided a heightened
competency standard for defendants electing to represent themselves. The
Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's standard and held that there is not a
heightened level of competency required to waive the right to effective
assistance of counsel, stating that "the competence that is required of a
defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the
right, not the competence to represent himself. ' 79 Thus, it matters not if the
defendant is incapable of effectively representing himself in court. What
matters is whether he can knowingly and intelligently waive his right to
counsel.
Following the Godinez decision, lower courts found themselves having to
allow defendants who were competent to stand trial the ability to represent
themselves in court, regardless of how questionable their ability to represent
themselves may have been. Scholars and courts alike amplified their criticism
of Faretta's grant of constitutional status to the right of self-representation. 80
Trials with pro se defendants clearly incapable of conducting a coherent-let
alone effective-defense cast doubt on the fairness of allowing such
defendants to represent themselves.
In 2000, the Supreme Court again examined the right of a defendant to
represent himself. In Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, the Court was
asked whether a defendant had the right to represent himself on appeal. 81 The
Court noted that the right to self-representation is found in the right to a fair
trial, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.82  Thus, a defendant has no
83constitutional right to proceed pro se on appeal. While the Martinez decision
does limit the ability of a defendant to act as his own counsel in certain
circumstances, Justice Kennedy concurred that the decision does not affect a
defendant's ability to defend himself at trial.84
76. Id. at 392-93.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 394 (quoting Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1992)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
79. Id. at 399.
80. See supra note 1.
81. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 154 (2000).
82. Id. at 159-60.
83. Id. at 163.
84. Id. at 164 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("To resolve this case it is unnecessary to cast doubt
upon the rationale of Faretta v. California. Faretta can be accepted as quite sound, yet it does
not follow that a convicted person has a similar right of self-representation on appeal." (citation
omitted)).
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Following the criticism of trials after Godinez, the Supreme Court
reexamined the competency standard for a defendant seeking to assert the right
to represent himself. In June 2008 the Supreme Court clarified the standard
used for determining a defendant's competency to represent himself in Indiana
v. Edwards.85 In Edwards, the Court held that a state can determine that a
defendant is competent to stand trial, yet not competent to represent himself at
that trial.86 In so holding, the Court noted that cases following Faretta "have
made [it] clear that the right of self-representation is not absolute."87  The
Court further acknowledged some of the problems presented by pro se
defendants and the criticism surrounding those cases in which defendants
chose to represent themselves. As Justice Breyer wrote for the Court, in a case
with "a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense
without the assistance of counsel ... the spectacle that could well result from
his self-representation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as
ennobling."8 8 The Court further noted that a trial involving a pro se defendant
of questionable capacity threatens "the most basic of the Constitution's
criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial. 89
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the majority opinion diminished the
strength of the right to self-representation and gave it lesser constitutional
import than other established rights.90 Justice Scalia opined that the majority
may have limited the right of self-representation based on a "suspicio[n] of the
constitutional footing of the right ... itself."91 He went on to state that "[t]he
right is not explicitly set forth in the text of the Sixth Amendment, and some
Members of [the] Court have expressed skepticism about Faretta's holding.,
92
85. 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2388 (2008) (explicitly declining to overrule Faretta). The defendant
in Edwards had a history of schizophrenia and was found incompetent to stand trial on multiple
occasions. Once determined competent to stand trial, he requested a continuance and the ability
to represent himself. The trial judge denied the request for continuance and the defendant
proceeded with counsel. After the jury failed to reach a verdict on certain charges, the State
retried the defendant. Prior to the second trial, the defendant again asserted the right to represent
himself. The trial judge held that the defendant was competent to stand trial, but not competent to
represent himself. Id. at 2382-83.
86. Id. at 2388. The Court distinguished Godinez by noting that the heightened standard in
Edwards related to the defendant's ability to conduct trial proceedings, rather than the
defendant's ability to enter a guilty plea. Id. at 2385. The Court further noted that in Godinez the
State sought to permit the defendant to proceed pro se, whereas in Edwards the State was seeking
to deny the defendant the ability to proceed pro se. Id.
87. Id. at 2384 (citing Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000);
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178-79 (1984)).
88. Id. at 2387.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2392 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Until today, the right of self-representation has been
accorded the same respect as other constitutional guarantees.").
91. Id. at 2393.
92. Id. (citing Martinez, 528 U.S. at 156-58; id at 164 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
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Yet despite this purported skepticism, and the majority's acknowledgment of
the problems created by the right to self-representation, the Edwards Court
expressly declined to overturn Faretta.93 Although lower courts, scholars, and
practitioners have critiqued the Faretta opinion since it was first decided, the
Supreme Court has expressly and repeatedly refused to overturn its landmark
holding and defendants have continued to choose to represent themselves in
criminal cases.
9 4
II. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN INQUISITORIAL AND ADVERSARIAL SYSTEMS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
While the right to represent oneself has been held to be a core right in the
adversarial system of justice, it is noteworthy that some trials in which a
defendant proceeds pro se take on attributes uncharacteristic of a typical
adversarial proceeding. In fact, these trials begin to look less like adversarial
proceedings, with the parties defining the issues and eliciting the testimony,
and more like inquisitorial proceedings, with the judge taking a more proactive
role in the trial process. In order to understand how and why these changes
93. Id. at 2388 (majority opinion).
94. The reasons cited by defendants for proceeding pro se in a criminal case are many and
varied. See Michele Morgan Bolton, More Defendants Take Law Into Their Own Hands, TIMES
UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Feb. 8, 2004, at Dl ("[A] growing number of civil and criminal litigants
are choosing to defend themselves, citing a shortage of cash, mistrust of lawyers or a misplaced
belief-based on popular courtroom dramas-that they can swing it on their own.").
Defendants often do not trust court appointed attorneys, assuming that they are part of the
government that has put defendant on trial in the first place, and therefore are incapable of
representing the defendant's best interests. Other defendants may believe that they are more than
capable of representing their own interests in court, having witnessed many real and fictional
trials on television programs. Other defendants may simply want to delay and disrupt the
proceedings against them, either because they can see no chance at an acquittal and simply want
to throw a wrench in the system, or they feel delay may help their interests in some way. Some
defendants are aware that they cannot speak on their own behalf without subjecting themselves to
cross-examination and possible confrontation with prior convictions and other impeachment
techniques. These defendants may realize that by representing themselves they may speak on
their own behalf in their opening statement, questioning of witnesses, and summations without
exposing themselves to impeachment or cross-examination. See id
In the case of pro se defendant Hosea Jackson, the defendant "was acquitted of punching and
robbing a clerk at the Dunbrook Mobil Station in Albany even after he left a letter he had written
to his girlfriend at the scene." Id. While the prosecutor was fairly confident in obtaining a guilty
verdict, "an impassioned closing argument in which Jackson basically begged jurors not to return
him to prison apparently worked in his favor." Id
Finally, some defendants choose to represent themselves because they intend to advance a
political defense, or object to the legality of the proceedings altogether. See, e.g., Motion by
Zacarias Moussaoui to Counter Dirty Insider Dealing by Fat Megalo Dunham for his Chief Pay
Persecution Master Ashcroft, United States v. Moussaoui, No. CRIM. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. May
12, 2003), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01 -cr-00455/docs/68749/1 .pdf, see
also John Rosenthal, Doing Justice to Zacarias Moussaoui, POL'Y REV., Dec. 2007 & Jan. 2008,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/l1886641.html (including many Moussaoui
trial transcript excerpts).
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take place, one must first examine the modem and historical differences
between inquisitorial and adversarial systems of justice.
Many civil law countries have an inquisitorial system of justice, rather than
the adversarial system used in the United States and England.95  This
fundamental structural difference has led to myriad resultant distinctions.
Those distinctions range from basic theoretical differences (the focus in civil
law countries is on substantive law, rather than procedural rights) 96 to
procedural differences (many civil law countries require that a criminal
defendant be represented by an attorney).97 In comparing the inquisitorial
system of civil law countries with the adversarial system of the United States,
this Article will focus primarily on the procedure in French courts.
98
A. Historical Emergence of the Inquisitorial System
The French inquisitorial system has its roots in the twelfth century.
99
Originally used by ecclesiastical courts to investigate charges of heresy,
inquisitorial procedures were ultimately adopted by secular courts to replace
adversarial proceedings.100 The inquisitorial system differed in some major
respects from the adversarial system that preceded it. The inquisitorial system
still employed the use of a judge, but now the judge was no longer the passive,
neutral arbiter of an adversarial system; rather, he became an active participant
in the criminal proceedings.101 Further, inquisitorial systems used government
investigators, not private accusers, and if the evidence provided by the
government investigator was unsatisfactory to the judge, the judge himself
could investigate.' 0 2 In fact, in its initial stages, the French inquisitorial system
allowed the judge to question witnesses outside of the presence of the
defendant.1
0 3
Both the inquisitorial and adversarial criminal systems were aimed at
discovering the truth of an accusation, but the systems diverged in their
definitions of truth. As some scholars have written,
95. See Stephen P. Freccero, An Introduction to the New Italian Criminal Procedure, 21
AM. J. CRIM. L. 345, 348 n.10 (1994).
96. See ERIKA FAIRCHILD, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 126 (1st ed. 1993)
("In the Civil Law, it is the substantive rules of the law, the rules that explain what is lawful and
what is not, rather than how one makes a case in court, that have tended to predominate.").
97. ERIKA FAIRCHILD & HARRY R. DAMMER, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS
148 (2d ed. 2001).
98. It has been noted that "French criminal procedure . . . is most typical of a pure
inquisitorial model." Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in
American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1018 (1974).
99. See HERBERT A. JOHNSON & NANCY TRAVIS WOLFE, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
70 (Elisabeth Roszmann Ebben ed., 3d ed. 2003).
100. See id. at 70-71.
101. See id at7l.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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Truth in the adversarial system was actually a determination of
which opposed position was more likely to be correct. Truth was a
matter of plausibility, of mature judgment, and of balancing two
versions of a given event against each other. By contrast, the
inquisitorial system demanded that one truth be ascertained by
assembling all available evidence. Every effort of reason and all
scientific knowledge had to be directed toward finding the truth.
Only upon such overwhelming evidence, and not upon less proof or
upon probabilities of guilt, could an accused be declared innocent or
guilty.
0 4
Confessions were a significant part of inquisitorial systems because the
overwhelming burden of proof required conclusiveness of fact, and
confessions were one of the few ways such conclusiveness could be
established.' 05
B. Current Distinctions Between Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems of
Justice
The inquisitorial system has evolved in the centuries since its adoption, and
the differences between modem inquisitorial systems of justice and modem
adversarial systems of justice are numerous and substantial. For example, the
pretrial process in the French inquisitorial system differs significantly from
that used in the American adversarial system.' 6 Suspects in France may be
interrogated by police without being given an opportunity to consult with
104. Id. at 71-72.
105. Id. at 72. The need for confessions to substantiate guilt led to the practice of torture,
which is often associated with inquisitorial systems of justice. In the early stages of the French
inquisitorial system, torture was an accepted method of extracting a confession from a defendant
and, indeed, obtaining information from a witness. See id.
106. The inquisitorial system in France today obviously no longer relies on the draconian
tactics it used in the twelfth century, but it does still retain some key characteristics of its earlier
stages. See FAIRCHILD, supra note 96, at 126-27. The contemporary French custom, it has been
observed, "appears to be principally concerned with the attempt to obtain an admission of the
truth of the charge from a person reasonably believed to be guilty; confession is self-evidently,
surely, the most proper result of a properly conducted instruction which does not end in a
discharge." Id at 127 (quoting MAURO CAPPELLETTI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 385 (1979)). Further,
[t]he essence of today's Continental inquiry systems of criminal justice consists of (1)
official-judicial control over gathering and presentation of evidence; (2) a professional
or mixed bench, as opposed to an all-lay jury, which decides both questions of law and
of fact; (3) a unitary trial in which the court determines guilt and sentence in one
proceeding; and (4) a flexible, episodic process from pretrial through appeal in which,
for example, appellate courts generally hear a case de novo and may call witnesses or
refer matters back to investigating magistrates to take new evidence.
Gordon Van Kessel, European Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial Evidence,
100 W. VA. L. REV. 799, 801 (1998).
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counsel. 107 Further, in French felony cases, a substantial part of the justice
107feln• cases part .
process is conducted prior to trial. Expansive pretrial investigation is
conducted by a magistrate, and requires that, before bringing a case to trial,
there must be witness testimony, fact-gathering, and interrogation of the
accused. 109  Because the pretrial investigation is conducted to determine
whether criminal charges should even be brought, the pretrial investigation is
not open to the public in order to avoid prejudicing the suspect.110 On the
other hand, these pretrial proceedings can extend for long periods of time, with
the suspect often in custody and not formally charged.' 1 '
The French pretrial investigation differs significantly from the pretrial
process in the United States. In the American adversarial system, great
emphasis is placed on the formality of the charge and the timing of a suspect's
access to a judge and an attorney. In the United States a defendant is charged
by a formal indictment, information, or complaint." Once arrested, a
defendant must appear publicly before a judge within forty-eight hours. 113 At
this appearance the judge reviews the probable cause for the arrest and
detention of the suspect." 4  Further, unlike practices in the inquisitorial
system, a suspect may not be questioned by police without being advised of his
right to an attorney.' 5 In addition, in the American adversarial system, if the
defendant opts to have an attorney present, all interrogation by the police must
cease.'1 6 Finally, the judicial authorities in the United States are not charged
with conducting or directing the investigation, nor are they permitted to
determine what charges to bring against a suspect. In the adversarial system of
justice, the prosecutor and police run the investigation and determine what
charges to file against a defendant.
The pretrial process is just one area in which significant differences between
the adversarial and inquisitorial criminal justice systems can be seen. The
107. Jacqueline Ross, Jacqueline Hodgson, French Criminal Justice: A Comparative
Account of the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime in France (Oxford, Hart Publishing,
2006), 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 370, 371-72 (2007) (book review) ("Though France now gives
defendants access to custodial legal advice, it does so only after the first 20 hours of garde 6
vue.").
108. See FAIRCHILD, supra note 96, at 126.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 126-27.
111. See id. ("[T]he potential for abuse in lengthy, secret pretrial proceedings is obvious. In
effect, the accused may spend long periods of time in detention, often without possibility of bail,
while the proceedings are going on .... In France in 1984, 51.9 percent of those in detention
were awaiting trial rather than serving sentences." (citation omitted)).
112. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 (1975).
113. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991); Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 126.
This does not apply to cases in which the defendant was arrested pursuant to a warrant (and
therefore subject to a judicial probable cause determination prior to arrest).
114. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
115. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 45 (1966).
116. Id.
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differences in the two systems are evident in nearly every aspect of the
proceedings, from procedures attendant to the initial investigation, to those
associated with the sentencing of a defendant found guilty. However, for
purposes of the discussion of the right to self-representation in an adversarial
system of justice, this Article focuses on four main areas of distinction between
adversarial and inquisitorial criminal trials: (1) the role of the judge at trial; (2)
the significance and use of evidentiary rules; (3) the role of the defendant at
trial; and (4) the right of a defendant to represent himself.
1. The Judge's Control of the Proceedings
Much like in an adversarial system, the judge in an inquisitorial system
presides over the trial.1 17 However, unlike in the United States, French judges
play a much more active role in the trial process. 118 An inquisitorial judge is
more proactive than the "neutral and detached" arbiter typically found in an
adversarial system." 9 The proactive nature of the judge's role in inquisitorial
proceedings represents the "affirmative obligation upon state officials to insure
that state policies, both substantive and procedural, are carried out." 120  The
judge, rather than the parties, ensures that these policies are met by controlling
both the investigation and the trial. Thus,
[the judge] is expected to take the initiative in amassing evidence and
in assuring that the merits of guilt and penalty are correctly assessed.
And the judiciary is accustomed to participating in and directing
investigative and administrative processes which, in [the American]
system, are largely left to police or to counsel.121
That is not to say that the parties do not assist the judge in his role, but "their
role is only secondary and supportive" and not the primary means by which
evidence is obtained. 122  Thus, an inquisitorial judge has the primaryresponsibility for calling witnesses to the stand and questioning those
117. FAIRCHILD, supra note 96, at 127. In France, for instance,
felony cases are presided over by a judge, called a president. Juries, another import
from Common Law systems, have been used in felony trials since the nineteenth
century, but in a modified form that allows for greater interchange between judge and
jury members. Although France has not abandoned trial by jury, as have most other
Civil Law countries, its practice resembles the system of lay judges that are common in
most Civil Law systems.
Id. (citation omitted).
118. Ross, supra note 107, at 371.
119. Martin Marcus, Above the Fray or Into the Breach: The Judge's Role in New York's
Adversarial System of Justice, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 1193, 1193 (1992).
120. Goldstein, supra note 98, at 1018. Professor Goldstein notes that it is typically the
judge who is assigned the task of ensuring that the state policies are fulfilled by the criminal
proceedings, but explains that some exceptions to this norm do exist. Id.
121. Id (noting that in an inquisitorial system the judge "regards himself as more than an
umpire").
122. Marcus, supra note 119, at 1193.
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witnesses.' 23  The inquisitorial judge also commonly asks questions of the
accused and can demand further inquiry by calling and questioning additional
witnesses or requiring further investigation.
124
In order to effectively control the proceedings and question witnesses, the
inquisitorial judge must be aware of the facts of a case before it is testified to at
trial. Thus, in the French system, a judge relies on a "dossier" containing all
relevant facts of the case. 12 1 In this way the judge is aware of what facts are
important to elicit from a witness and can more effectively call and question
witnesses regarding those facts. The French judge is tasked with aiding in the
determination of the truth of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and so is given
the responsibility of eliciting facts that will lead to this ultimate
determination. 12 6 Thus, with dossier in hand, and a knowledge of all relevant
facts before the proceedings begin, the inquisitorial judge controls and directs
the course of proceedings in a criminal trial.
2 7
In an adversarial system of justice, the judge oversees the trial process, but
does not control the course of the proceedings in the way that an inquisitorial
judge controls the trial process. A hallmark of the adversarial system is that
the parties control the direction of the trial, with each side determining what
facts to enter in evidence, what witnesses to call, what arguments to make, and
what objections to raise. 28 An adversarial judge will oversee this process and
rule on objections and evidentiary issues, but the judge will not determine what
facts need to be introduced into evidence to prove a particular argument, nor
ask questions to ensure that relevant information is entered in the record for the
finder of fact to consider.12 9 These tasks are assigned to the prosecution and
the defense. In a system based on a contest between two parties, the burden
falls on those parties if one side fails to make an effective argument or properly
introduce a fact. 30  Thus, unlike an inquisitorial judge, the judge in the
American adversarial system relies heavily on the parties to define the relevant
issues in a case and argue facts and law related to those issues.
2. Significance and Use of Evidentiary Rules
Inquisitorial systems typically focus more on the substantive rights of a
defendant than on procedural rights.' 3 1 In an inquisitorial trial, by contrast,
123. Id. at 1194.
124. FAIRCHILD & DAMMER, supra note 97, at 149.
125. Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of the Judge in Assisting Pro Se
Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York City's Housing Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y
& ETHICS J. 659, 691 (2006).
126. Marcus, supra note 119, at 1194.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 1193-94.
129. See id. at 1194.
130. See Goldstein, supra note 98, at 1016-17.
131. See FAIRCHILD, supra note 96, at 126.
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less emphasis is placed on procedural rules and more weight is given to the
substantive rights of the defendant. Because an inquisitorial judge is assigned
to the ultimate task of eliciting information to determine the truth of the
defendant's guilt or innocence, the court is not significantly restricted by strict
evidentiary rules.1 32 A finder of fact in the French inquisitorial system is
permitted to consider all relevant information, regardless of its reliability. 133 It
is left to the finder of fact to determine which facts should be given greater
weight, and which facts should be discounted as unreliable or unimportant.
134
Thus, "[flew rules of evidence inhibit the judge and the state has no explicit
burden of proof or persuasion."'
35
These relaxed evidentiary procedures lie in stark contrast to the strict
procedural rules employed in the adversarial system of the United States.
Because the American system is a contest between two parties, the fairness of
proceedings relies heavily on strict adherence to the rules governing the
contest. Rules regarding the admissibility of evidence ensure that false or
unreliable facts are not presented to the finder of fact as evidence. Much of an
adversarial criminal trial involves arguments based on the numerous
evidentiary rules and the precedent interpreting those rules. The admissibility
of evidence is a key component of the American legal system, and trials are
won or lost on these technical legal rules. Thus, parties in an adversarial
system must be well-versed in the effective introduction of evidence, including
procedures on laying a proper foundation to have a fact admitted into evidence,
and arguments for the exclusion of evidence.
3. The Role of the Defendant at Trial
Another significant difference between the French inquisitorial system and
the American adversarial system is the ability of a defendant to speak in his
own defense.
136
Continental rules of procedure and evidence place fewer
impediments in the way of defendants actively participating at trial
than do American rules. For example, use of prior convictions does
not turn on whether the accused decides to testify. Also, the
presiding judge already has seen defendant's record in the dossier,
though technically the dossier is not considered evidence in some
countries. Finally, because the Continental defendant is not sworn
as a witness he is not subject to prosecution for perjury. 137
132. See Goldstein, supra note 98, at 1018-19.
133. Id. at 1019.
134. Id. (noting that a magistrate is tasked with considering all "logically probative evidence"
and can therefore consider almost anything).
135. Id. at 1018.
136. See Van Kessel, supra note 106, at 817 & n.70.
137. Id. at 833 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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Indeed, in Continental criminal trials, the accused is encouraged to be an active
participant in the proceedings, and may even be invited by the judge to respond
to certain witness testimony.1 38 Thus, a defendant in the inquisitorial system of
justice is able to give his narrative to the finder of fact directly, without being
placed under oath and subject to perjury proceedings should he lie. As
discussed above, the inquisitorial finder of fact is tasked with determining what
weight to give all probative evidence, including the unswom testimony of the
defendant.'
39
In the American adversarial system, the only way in which a represented
defendant can speak directly to the finder of fact is by testifying on his own
behalf. In order to testify, the defendant must be placed under oath. Further,
the defendant typically cannot engage in a narrative on the stand, but instead
must respond to questioning by his counsel and the prosecution. Indeed, in this
way the defendant is really speaking to the attorney questioning him, rather
than the finder of fact (although the clear purpose of such testimony is to
provide the defendant's version of relevant events to the finder of fact). Unlike
in the inquisitorial system, if a defendant lies in his testimony, he is subject to
perjury charges. Thus, the defendant's role in an adversarial proceeding varies
from that of a defendant in an inquisitorial proceeding.
4. The Defendant's Right to Represent Himself at Trial
Finally, a significant difference between the American adversarial system of
justice and the French inquisitorial system of justice is that, in the French
inquisitorial system, criminal defendants are required to be represented by
counsel. "Since 1897 French law has required that an attorney represent the
accused during the process of pretrial investigation. The magistrate may not
ask questions of the accused unless this attorney is present, and the accused
may not refuse assistance of counsel.' 140 Relevant to this point is the fact that
defense attorneys in France do not merely represent the interests of their client,
but those of the justice system as well. 14 1 The concern of the inquisitorial
system is to determine the truth of the defendant's guilt through a probing
138. See id at 834.
139. See supra Part II.B.2.
140. It should be noted, however, that in France and other Continental legal systems,
defendants may be interrogated without counsel immediately following arrest. "There is no
general understanding on the Continent that a right to counsel during initial questioning of
suspects by the police is a necessary aspect of a fair criminal process." Van Kessel, supra note
106, at 810. For example, the Netherlands permit police to hold and interrogate a suspect for the
initial six hours of detention without counsel "as opposed to questioning by the investigating
magistrate, which takes place later in serious cases." Id. at 811-12.
141. See Van Kessel, supra note 106, at 815 ("Defense attorneys generally perceive of
themselves as defenders, but not obstructionists, and as responsible to the system of justice, as
well as to the client. These perceptions are supported by a general understanding that finding out
what happened and why-truth discovery-is an important part of the process." (footnote
omitted)).
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investigation of all relevant facts. Thus, a defendant's autonomy interests in
representing himself in trial proceedings are subordinate to the ultimate
investigation and determination of the truth. Therefore, a defendant is not
permitted to represent himself at trial in the French system.
142
This plainly contrasts with the defendant's constitutional right to represent
himself at trial in the American adversarial system. While scholars,
practitioners, and judges have noted that this right undermines the fairness of
criminal trial proceedings, the American system of justice places greater
weight on a defendant's autonomy interests than does the French inquisitorial
system. Thus, subject to previously enumerated exceptions, a defendant is
constitutionally permitted to represent himself at trial in the United States.
These differences between the American adversarial and French inquisitorial
systems of justice may appear clear and well-defined. It is interesting to note,
then, that in certain areas these two systems begin to overlap. One of the
clearest examples of this overlap is when a defendant in the American
adversarial system chooses to represent himself. When this occurs, the
adversarial process is turned on its head. The fair contest between two fairly
matched parties begins to look like "a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to
gladiators."' 143  In order to compensate for the unbalanced nature of the
proceedings, the actors in a pro se criminal trial may abandon their traditional
roles in some ways. Indeed, these proceedings may begin to take on
characteristics of inquisitorial trials in order to ensure the fairness of the
outcome. Thus, in cases involving pro se defendants, the American adversarial
system of justice begins to adopt some characteristics of an inquisitorial system
ofjustice.
III. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN A PRO SE CRIMINAL TRIAL AND THE MERGING OF
INQUISITORIAL AND ADVERSARIAL SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE
Despite the outward appearance of clear distinctions between the adversarial
criminal justice system of the United States and the inquisitorial criminal
justice system of France, in practice and on closer examination many of these
142. FAIRCHILD & DAMMER, supra note 97, at 148. Related to this point, a defendant is also
not permitted to plead guilty and avoid a trial. See id. at 148-49. The inquisitorial system's
emphasis on the determination of an empirical truth extends to a defendant's ability to bargain
with the state for a lesser sentence and avoidance of trial. Even if a defendant confesses in the
French system, a trial will be conducted to determine the truth of the defendant's guilt. See id.
Thus, the subordination of the defendant's autonomy interests encompass not only his inability to
represent himself, but also his ability to bargain with the state to achieve a lesser sentence in
exchange for a guilty plea.
143. United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 1975). But see
Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se
Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REv. 423, 423 (2007). Professor Hashimoto has engaged in an
interesting analysis of data from state and federal felony cases and has determined that pro se
defendants may not fare as poorly in criminal cases as commonly thought. See id
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distinctions are less obvious. 144  In cases involving pro se defendants, the
distinctions between inquisitorial and adversarial systems of justice previously
• • 145
discussed become muddled and features begin to interweave. In a pro se
criminal trial, some adversarial customs may be abandoned and American
norms central to the control over the proceedings, strict procedural
requirements, and the role of the defendant may give way to procedures that
resemble an inquisitorial trial.
This change in the character of some pro se criminal proceedings is a direct
result of the need for courts to balance the autonomy interests of the defendant
with the fairness of the trial. Trials in which a defendant represents himself
present a host of problems that undermine the fairness of the proceedings.
Determinations of competency, 146 conflicts with standby counsel, 147 utilization
of proper procedure,48 and overall fairness of the proceedings are all called
144. Indeed, some scholars have noted that the distinctions between the two systems have
never been entirely clear. For example, while a significant characteristic of the American
adversarial system is the lack of judicial involvement in the investigative process, "[flrom the
earliest times, grand juries and justices of the peace have served investigative functions, even
though they are judicial agencies." Goldstein, supra note 98, at 1019-20.
145. This blurring of the lines between the adversarial and inquisitorial system is particularly
noteworthy because Americans have a generally negative perception of the inquisitorial system of
justice employed in other countries. Although Americans "generally are receptive to reforming
our system of justice, we have an instinctive reaction against foreign, particularly European,
systems based on a distrust of anything inquisitory and a confidence in adversary forms of
procedure." Van Kessel, supra note 106, at 800.
146. While the Supreme Court has recently clarified the standard for determining a
defendant's competence to represent himself, the determination that a defendant is competent to
elect to represent himself can present difficulties for a judge and defense counsel. Counsel for the
defendant must zealously represent his client, but also follow his client's wishes. When an
attorney is unsure of the competency of his client, and his client elects to represent himself, the
attorney's role is unclear.
147. Another area that scholars and courts have focused on in criticizing the Faretta decision
is when the court chooses to appoint standby counsel to assist the defendant in representing
himself. Appointment of standby counsel is common practice in proceedings where a defendant
is "representing himself." In theory, standby counsel provides legal guidance to the defendant
while still protecting his autonomy interests by allowing him to represent himself. In practice, as
scholars have noted, the appointment of standby counsel can create as many problems as it solves.
See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, The Role of Standby Counsel in Criminal Cases: In the Twilight
Zone of the Criminal Justice System, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 676, 677-78 (2000). Standby counsel
are often in an untenable situation, required to protect the interests of their clients while allowing
their clients to choose the manner, mode, and execution of their defense. If the defense attorney
interferes with the trial in order to zealously represent his client, he interferes with his client's
autonomy interests. On the other hand, if he sits back and lets his client flounder without
guidance on the best defense and the way in which to present it, his utility in the courtroom is
questionable.
148. Assuming that a defendant is held to be competent to elect to represent himself, and that
standby counsel is not appointed to assist in the defense, problems are presented in the method by
which the defendant conducts his defense at trial. Pro se defendants are unlikely to be aware of
complex procedural rules, or the manner in which a trial is conducted. Trial judges are reluctant
to allow defendants to shoot themselves in the foot because of a lack of knowledge of procedural
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into question when a defendant proceeds pro se. As Judge Reinhardt stated in
a concurrence to United States v. Farhad, "the right to self-representation has
now been extended to the point that it frequently, though not always, conflicts
squarely and inherently with the right to a fair trial."'149 Indeed, because of the
inherent problems associated with a defendant proceeding pro se, it is typical
for judges to strongly discourage defendants from asserting this constitutional
right.'5
Yet when a defendant ignores these warnings and decides to proceed pro se,
the court still must ensure the fairness of the proceedings and the accuracy of
the verdict. In doing so, some courts have adopted procedures that mimic
those used in other countries. 5' In order to understand these changes in the
criminal trial process, this section examines the adoption of practices
resembling those used in inquisitorial systems and how this adoption addresses
some of the problems posed when a defendant represents himself at trial. It is
interesting to note that while these problems occur in pro se adversarial
proceedings in the United States, similar problems have arisen in international
criminal proceedings, representing a hybrid of adversarial and inquisitorial
procedures. 152
A. Control of the Proceedings
In an adversarial system of justice the parties typically control the
proceedings at trial. This means that the parties define the issues, decide what
arguments to make, decide what witnesses to call, decide what testimony to
elicit from those witnesses, make objections to inappropriate questioning or
testimony, and decide what to focus on in their opening and closing statements
rules or proper examination techniques. "While a criminal trial is not a game in which the
participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of
unarmed prisoners to gladiators." Twomey, 510 F.2d at 640.
149. United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J., concurring
specially).
150. The judge will often explain to the defendant the difficulty in proceeding pro se, and the
near certainty that he will be better served by utilizing counsel. See Myron Moskovitz, Advising
the Pro Se Defendant: The Trial Court's Duties Under Faretta, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 329, 332
(2003-2004) ("Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer
in order to competently and intelligently choose self-representation, he should be made aware of
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."). But see Dallio v. Spitzer, 343
F.3d 553, 555 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that an explicit warning on the dangers of proceeding pro
se is not constitutionally required).
151. See Goldstein, supra note 98, at 1018.
152. In several international criminal cases, the tribunals have adopted procedures more akin
to an adversarial process, and in so doing have granted the defendant the right to represent
himself. In these international pro se criminal proceedings, problems have arisen akin to those in
American pro se criminal proceedings. See Daryl A. Mundis & Fergal Gaynor, Current
Developments at the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 642, 664-
68 (2004).
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to the jury. When one of the parties is not represented by counsel, however, it
is less clear who is controlling the trial.
While there is a long-held American ideal of the judge as neutral arbiter
overseeing a case in which control of the issues and evidence is in the hands of
the prosecution and defense, in practice
[judges] restrict control of the case by the parties and restrain the
jury's impulses towards irrationality and nullification of law.
Moreover, many American judges comment on the evidence, require
that witnesses be summoned even when counsel do not call them,
appoint experts, suggest defenses to counsel, use the doctrines of
"plain error" and "effective assistance of counsel" to intrude upon
counsel's control of the case, and apply "harmless error" to excuse
counsel's inadequacies.
153
Thus, the passivity of the judge and control of proceedings by the parties,
believed by many to be fundamental attributes of the adversarial system, may
not be as ubiquitous as commonly thought. In pro se criminal cases, the
adoption of procedures resembling inquisitorial practices becomes more
obvious than in other areas of the adversarial justice system. Because of the
judge's role in ensuring a fair trial, the role of neutral arbiter is sometimes
abandoned when a defendant decides to represent himself, and the judge
begins to look less like the detached overseer of the adversarial system and
more like the proactive participant in the inquisitorial process.'
54
The judge in a pro se criminal trial may attempt to exert control over the
proceedings by informing the defendant of the relevant issues to address and
assisting the pro se defendant in asking questions to effectively elicit the
desired responses. In Commonwealth v. Jackson, the judge "attempt[ed] to
153. Goldstein, supra note 98, at 1022.
154. Inquisitorial legal systems are also taking on more aspects of adversarial criminal
systems. As Professor Van Kessel wrote, "[i]nspired by the Court of Human Rights, as well as
Perry Mason and LA Law, Continentals have been moving toward more adversary forms of
procedure, and today Continental justice systems contain numerous adversary elements." Van
Kessel, supra note 106, at 802 (footnote omitted). Indeed, this movement toward adversarial
procedures may be due in part to the civil-law requirement that a defendant be represented by a
lawyer at all stages of the proceedings. Furthermore,
[t]he mandatory representation by an attorney, which predated the provision of
attorneys to indigents in the United States by over half a century, is actually antithetical
to the spirit of pretrial investigations within the inquisitorial process. These
investigations were meant to be inquiries, similar to police investigations before a
suspect is arrested, that would help to determine if charges should be brought against an
individual. While this rule that an attorney be assigned to the accused was designed to
ensure that no abuses would occur during the investigation, the result, according to
some commentators, has been to lengthen the process and inject a note of formality that
makes it far less useful as a preliminary investigation than it was originally planned.
FAIRCHILD & DAMMER, supra note 97, at 127. Thus, it seems that the use of counsel tends to
create an environment more akin to an adversarial system of justice, and absence of counsel tends
to create an environment with inquisitorial attributes.
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assist the defendant by explaining to him how to show that a witness made a
prior inconsistent statement at the probable cause hearing. ' 155 In so doing, the
judge helped define the relevant issues and arguments for the defendant, and
assisted him in asking questions of the witness on the stand.
A judge may seek to define the issues at trial because the defendant may
define the issues in a way that does not allow for the most relevant evidence to
be presented to the finder of fact. In United States v. Davis, the defendant
elected to represent himself at the penalty phase of his capital murder trial.
56
The defendant chose not to present any mitigating evidence to the jury. 157 The
judge, presented with a situation where the jury was not going to be informed
of relevant facts, opted to appoint an independent counsel to present mitigating
evidence to the jury. 158 The judge found the power to appoint an outside
attomey in the inherent authority of a federal district court to appoint amicus
curiae counsel. 159 In so doing, the judge noted the difficult situation presented
by a defendant defining the issues of a capital case and choosing not to engage
in a vigorous defense:
"[t]he public has a substantial independent interest in being assured
of a full and fair sentencing proceeding, in compliance with
constitutional and statutory requirements, so that the death penalty is
not imposed arbitrarily and capriciously."' 
60
Despite the trial court's attempts to ensure the fairness of the sentencing
hearing, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that
155. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 647 N.E.2d 401, 405 n.6 (Mass. 1995). The appellate court
went on to note that "[t]he judge could have, but did not, simply exclude the questions and require
the defendant to question the witnesses correctly or to forego presenting that evidence before the
jury." Id.
156. United States v. Davis, 180 F. Supp. 2d 797, 797 (E.D. La. 2001), writ of mandamus
granted, remanded by 285 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2002).
157. Id. As Judge Dennis noted in his dissent on the appeal of this case, the defendant chose
not to present mitigating evidence because he was actively seeking the death penalty: "Davis's
own words reveal that his sole motivation is to receive the death penalty, and he has gone so far
as to threaten to do nothing at the sentencing trial in order to realize this goal." United States v.
Davis, 285 F.3d 378, 386 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
158. Davis, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 797-98.
159. Id. at 799-800.
160. Id. at 798. The trial court noted the inherent unfairness of a sentencing hearing that only
considers aggravating factors. The court cited the Supreme Court to support its decision that
mitigating factors must be considered:
"[A] sentencing system that allow[s] the jury to consider only aggravating
circumstances would almost certainly fall short of providing the individual sentencing
determination that we ... have held ... to be required by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. . . . A jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of all relevant
evidence not only why a death sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not
be imposed."
Id. at 798-99 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976)) (alterations in original).
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the appointment of independent counsel interfered with the defendant's
constitutional right to represent himself. 161 As the appellate court noted,
[a]n individual's constitutional right to represent himself is one of
great weight and considerable importance in our criminal justice
system. This right certainly outweighs an individual judge's limited
discretion to appoint amicus counsel when that appointment will
yield a presentation to the jury that directly contradicts the approach
undertaken by the defendant.
62
The appeals court remanded the case, and ordered the sentencing hearing to
.... . . 163
proceed without the presentation of relevant mitigating evidence.
Judges presiding over pro se criminal proceedings may also help define the
arguments presented at trial. In Brown v. Alaska, the judge instructed the
defendant on the types of arguments that could be made at trial, noting that the
defendant's arguments to the jury were inappropriate in a criminal trial. 164 The
defendant in Brown was accused of burglary and criminal mischief.165 In his
opening statement, the defendant repeatedly attempted to make a jury
nullification argument. 166 The judge instructed the defendant and the jury that.... 167
the finder of fact could not ignore the law in coming to a verdict. The
defendant openly argued with the judge about this point, in front of the jury.
168
On appeal, the defendant argued that the statements of the judge were
prejudicial to his case. 6 9 The Court of Appeals of Alaska disagreed. The
appellate court found that the judge appropriately steered the defendant in his
opening statement in defining arguments that could not be made. 170
Perhaps nowhere is the control of proceedings more uncertain than in cases
where a pro se defendant chooses not to contest his guilt, but rather opts to
contest the validity of the proceedings. These defendants wish to use the
criminal trial as a platform from which to express a political viewpoint or
rejection of the system of justice which is placing them on trial. These
defendants will often use their pretrial motions and opening and closing
statements to explain their political agenda, rather than argue the merits of the
case. And the defendants will call and cross examine witnesses, not to prove
or disprove the fact of their guilt, but rather to further support their message. It
would be difficult for a defendant in an adversarial criminal setting to promote
161. Davis, 285 F.3d at 381.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 385.
164. Brown v. Alaska, No. A-8827, 2007 WL 2143010, at *8 (Alaska Ct. App. July 25,
2007).
165. Id. at*1.
166. Id. at *8.
167. Id
168. Id
169. Id
170. Id.
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this political defense if he were represented by an attorney. 171 Thus, it is more
likely that a defendant would be able to promote a political agenda while
representing himself, rather than if he were represented by an attorney.172
Such pro se defendants provide particular difficulties for the adversarial
criminal trial setting, in that they are difficult to confine to the rules of
procedure. Even more problematic, however, is the threat to fairness such
tactics pose to the adversarial criminal trial. Defendants wishing to promote a
political agenda may be charged with any range of crimes and enlist any
number of tactics or strategies. In recent years, however, the more prominent
instances of self-representation have involved an international component.
Trials of accused terrorists, such as Zacharias Moussaoui, have involved
requests for self-representation by the defendant.
In United States v. Moussaoui, similar issues arose when the defendant
asserted his right to self-representation in federal district court.' 73 Moussaoui
was charged with being a co-conspirator of the terrorists who attacked the
United States on September 11, 2001.174 Initially the trial judge allowed
Moussaoui to file briefs with the court, but she appointed standby counsel to
171. Hashimoto, supra note 143, at 475. Lawyers are governed by strict rules of behavior
and are required to follow the rules of the court, evidence, and procedure when appearing on
behalf of their client, regardless of whether the client wishes them to do otherwise. Violation of
these rules could lead to a lawyer being held in contempt, barred from appearance, and even
disbarred from the profession. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.1, 8.2 (2007).
172. Indeed, as has been seen clearly in the conviction of attorney Lynne Stewart, lawyers
put themselves at risk when representing politically unpopular defendants and abiding by their
clients' wishes. See Richard Acello, Stewart Conviction: A Big Chill?, 4 ABA J. EREP. 7, Feb.
18, 2005. Lynne Stewart represented Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman who was convicted of
masterminding the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d
279 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In the Sattar case, the Attorney General imposed special administrative
measures that prevented Rahman from communication with the public. Id. at 289. Because of a
fear that Rahman had a dangerous influence over other terrorists, Rahman was only permitted to
communicate with his attorney and immediate family members. Id. at 289-90. Stewart was
charged with assisting Rahman's communication with his followers through the transmission of
letters and a press release that Stewart read to a reporter, which announced Rahman's withdrawal
of support for a cease-fire with Egypt. Acello, supra. Stewart was convicted of providing
material aid to terrorists, among other things. Id. Throughout her trial, Stewart maintained she
was merely acting as a zealous advocate for her client, and was not guilty of materially supporting
terrorism. See Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 286-321. Stewart's conviction sent shockwaves
through the legal community, and increased the likelihood that an attorney could face much more
than contempt charges if she chooses to assist her client in mounting a political defense, making
such representation on the part of an attorney extremely unlikely. See Acello, supra; Sarah
Werthan Buttenwieser, Column, Echoes of 1950, NEWSDAY, Feb. 27, 2005, at A41.
173. See United States v. Moussaoui, 43 F. App'x 612, 613 (4th Cir. 2002) (dismissing
appeals by Moussaoui challenging orders appointing counsel to him). The Supreme Court
eventually denied the defense petition for writ of certiorari to review the case. Moussaoui v.
United States, 544 U.S. 931 (2005).
174. United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480,483 (E.D. Va. 2003).
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assist Moussaoui in his defense. 17  After this decision, however, Moussaoui
filed objectionable pleadings and caused delays in the proceedings. 176 Thus, in
December 2003, the judge reappointed defense counsel to represent
Moussaoui, noting that she would not accept any pleadings filed by Moussaoui
that were not submitted through his attorneys. Moussaoui's refusal to
participate in the adversarial process in a way that would result in a fair trial
required the judge to intrude on his right to self-representation.
Often this appears to be the result of trials where defendants proceed pro se,
particularly those trials in which the defendant uses the courtroom as a
platform to argue a political agenda or question the legitimacy of the
proceedings. The control of these trials no longer appears to lie in the hands of
the parties, and judges are ill-equipped to handle such proceedings. Thus,
many defendants who begin criminal proceedings may have their right to
represent themselves revoked by the time of trial. If the defendant is
disruptive, obstructionist, or engages in tactics to delay the proceedings, the
judge may determine that he should no longer be permitted to represent
himself and appoint defense counsel to take over the case.
Indeed, judges have been criticized or reversed for failing to assert sufficient
control over trials involving a self-represented defendant. In United States v.
Nivica, the appellate court upheld the appropriateness of the trial judge's
requirement that the defendant ask questions of himself on the stand.'
78
However, in a concurrence, Judge Reinhardt criticized the decision of the trial
court to force the defendant to engage in such questioning:
[T]he district judge should have taken steps, sua sponte, to protect
Wellington's interests in securing a fair trial. The right to testify in
one's own defense is a fundamental constitutional right, and [the
defendant's] attempt to offer his own testimony, by means of self-
questioning, was obviously a total failure.... [A] willingness on the
part of the district court to explore alternative methods of enabling
[the defendant] to testify in his own defense, and a sensitivity to the
difficulties presented by the defendant's attempt to elicit essential
testimony through self-questioning, would have better served the
175. See United States v. Moussaoui, No. CRIM. 01-455-A, 2002 WL 1311738, at *1 (E.D.
Va. June 14, 2002).
176. Jerry Markon, Court Reins in Terror Suspect, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 1, 2004 at 7A
("What followed [Judge Brinkema's ruling] was a 17-month stream of blistering handwritten
motions, scrawled from Moussaoui's jail cell in Alexandria, in which he taunted the government,
blasted his attorneys and compared Brinkema to a Nazi SS officer.... Moussaoui's trial was
delayed twice because of issues resulting from his self-representation, such as the multitude of
documents he had to review from his jail cell.").
177. Id.
178. United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1123 (1st Cir. 1989).
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interests of justice and afforded greater protection to the important
constitutional right at stake.
179
Thus, Judge Reinhardt noted that the trial judge should have understood and
acknowledged that there are differences between overseeing a trial involving a
represented defendant and a trial involving a pro se defendant. Indeed, the
concurring opinion indicated that the appropriate course of action for the trial
judge would have been to take a more proactive role in the trial to ensure
protection of the pro se defendant's constitutional rights.
In Grubbs v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana went as far as reversing the
lower court for not having asserted sufficient control over the proceedings.,
80
In Grubbs, the pro se defendant failed to object to prejudicial and irrelevant
testimony elicited by the prosecution.! 88 In reversing the trial court, the high
court of Indiana held that
[a] trial court cannot sit idly by in a circumstance of this sort. He
must actively direct the course of the trial so as to protect the
ultimate purpose of that trial which is to bring about a decision by
the judge or jury which is based upon relevant and non-hearsay
evidence.182
Thus, in a criminal trial in which a defendant represents himself, a judge may
be more proactive in directing the course of the proceedings than in a trial
where both sides are represented by counsel. While the courts have held that
the Constitution does not require judges to take on a more proactive role in
trials involving pro se defendants, in order to ensure a fair trial judges may
become more involved in the process to assist the self-represented defendant.
Much like inquisitorial proceedings, a judge may actively engage in
questioning witnesses, including the defendant. The judge may also clarify
and define the issues presented by the case and assist the defendant in eliciting
testimony relevant to those issues. This proactive behavior of the trial judge,
resembling that of a judge in an inquisitorial system, helps to ensure the
fairness of the trial and protect the defendant's constitutional rights.
B. Significance and Use of Procedural Rules
Related to the judge's greater control over proceedings involving a pro se
defendant is the involvement of the judge in eliciting testimony and the
employment of more relaxed evidentiary and procedural rules used in a trial in
which a defendant represents himself. A defendant who is untrained in the law
is little able to effectively use the strict procedural rules of the adversarial
system. Even if a pro se defendant is aware of the issues and arguments
relevant to his case, he may not know what evidence to introduce to prove his
179. Id at 1128 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
180. Grubbs v. State, 265 N.E.2d 40, 44-45 (Ind. 1970).
181. Id. at43.
182. Id.
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defense. If he is aware of the relevant evidence, he may still be incapable of
laying a proper foundation to have that evidence admitted. Further, a
defendant who represents himself may allow prejudicial or irrelevant testimony
to enter the record because he does not know to object. The complicated
evidentiary and procedural rules in place in the United States ensure an even
playing field, even between the resource-rich government and a public
defender. However, for these procedural rules to protect the defendant's right
to a fair trial, they must be used effectively. A pro se defendant's lack of
knowledge of procedural rules undermines the fairness of the proceedings.
A judge presiding over a trial involving a self-represented defendant may
assist the defendant in navigating the complicated procedural and conduct rules
with which the defendant will be required to comply.183 Because a pro se
defendant usually has little knowledge of the complex procedural rules that
ensure fair trials in the United States, the judge may instruct the defendant on
the rights that he has under the Constitution. For example, the judge may
inform the defendant that he has the right not to testify, and that if he does
testify he may be impeached with prior testimony. 184  The judge may also
advise a pro se defendant on more technical procedural rules, such as jury
selection and specific rules of evidence.1 85 Courts have held that trial judges
are not required to instruct pro se defendants on these laws and rules in
criminal trials. But in order to ensure a fair trial and keep the proceedings
running efficiently and within the rules, a judge will often abandon, to some
extent, his role as a detached and passive arbiter and inform a pro se defendant
of his rights and how to protect those rights under the law.
1 86
In addition to informing a defendant of the complicated rights and
procedures in place to ensure fair trials in the United States, judges may also
go one step further and become an active participant in the trial process by
183. See, e.g., United States v. Pavich, 568 F.2d 33, 40 (7th Cir. 1978). In Pavich,
the trial judge assisted the defendant in the proper technique to lay a foundation for a
prior statement; to impeach a prior statement; and to introduce a document into
evidence. The trial court also attempted to advise the defendant outside the hearing of
the jury to avoid eliciting damaging evidence.
Id. (citations omitted).
184. In People v. Barnum, 64 P.3d 788 (Cal. 2003), the California Court of Appeal
determined that the judge need not advise a pro se defendant of his right not to testify under
Faretta, id. at 799. However, the court also stated that
[i]n any given case, the court remains free to provide such an advisement, so long as its
words do not stray from neutrality toward favoring any one option over another. A trial
court of course must proceed carefully in providing an advisement, but it may provide
one if it deems appropriate.
Id. at 799 (quoted in Moskovitz, supra note 150, at 335).
185. See Pavich, 568 F.2d at 40.
186. See Bolton, supra note 94 (quoting Albany County Judge Thomas A. Breslin as stating
that, in the case of pro se defendants, his "hands are pretty well tied .... You can't let a
miscarriage ofjustice occur, but in the same breath, you can't be the second defense lawyer. I tell
people, 'Please don't do this. You don't have the training to do this."').
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rejecting improper evidence or testimony, sua sponte, and by conducting
questioning themselves.' 87 In the American criminal justice system, courts
rely on the adversarial nature of the system to highlight and prevent
inappropriate questioning or evidence. In a pro se trial, the defendant is often
ill-equipped to identify an improper question or object to such a question.
Thus, a judge observing such impropriety may step in and object to the
question himself, at the same time ruling on the objection and striking any
witness response. In this way the judge ensures that a lack of procedural
knowledge on the part of the defendant does not undermine the fairness of the
proceedings. Further, if a witness on the stand is not being effectively
questioned by the pro se defendant, and the judge believes further questioning
is necessary to clarify the witness's statements, the judge may step in and do
the questioning.
188
When the court does become more proactive in protecting the procedural
rights of the defendant, it can put the judge, as a neutral arbiter, in a difficult
position. For
[w]hile the trial judge has a broad discretion with respect to his
interrogation of witnesses, he must always be sensitive to his role as
a judge and the fact that in the eyes of the jury he "occupies a
position of preeminence and special persuasiveness" and accordingly
"be assiduous in performing his function as governor of the trial
dispassionately, fairly and impartially."
'189
Thus, the trial judge is placed in a complicated position when he presides over
a pro se criminal trial. "An overprotective judge who refuses to allow a
defendant to jeopardize his own defense may be reversed, and a judge who
does not make a copious inquiry into the thought process of the accused (which
187. JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A
REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 57-58 (Am. Judicature Soc'y
1998). Some judges have noted the following techniques for dealing with pro se litigants:
"I give the pro se greater latitude and on critical issues I may ask questions and make
my own objections that normally are made by trial counsel"; "The court begins the trial
by asking extensive questions of each party, under oath; this seems to work well with
custody cases, the bulk of our caseload"; "I guide them through the process a bit-
making sure they know they have the right to object to the other party's proffered
evidence and nudging them along by asking them if they want X to be marked and they
want X to be admitted"; and "[I suggest] how the evidence sought might properly be
presented."
Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge of
Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. COURT REV. 36, 58 n.73 (2002) (alteration in original).
188. See GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 187, at 57-58. There is nothing in the
Constitution preventing a judge from questioning a witness himself, so long as he does not
overstep his bounds as a neutral arbiter. In most trials, however, the questioning is left solely in
the hands of counsel, with the contest-like atmosphere of the adversarial system hinging on the
effectiveness of each lawyer at eliciting or discrediting testimony.
189. United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting United States v.
Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 879 (4th Cir. 1970)).
[Vol. 58:445
2009] Procedures to Ensure Fairness in Pro Se Criminal Trials 481
may themselves [sic] be characterized as trial strategy) is subject to an appeal
.... 1190 Yet trial judges have the inherent authority to call and question
witnesses, and may choose to do so in trials where a pro se defendant is not
able to adequately use strict procedural rules to present his defense.'
91
In State v. Hutch, a defendant accused of theft, terroristic threatening, and
assault elected to represent himself.192  At times during the trial, the judge
determined that the defendant's questions posed to witnesses were unclear or
did not fully elicit material facts. 19 3  In order to clarify the questions and
"further elicit material facts," the trial judge stepped in and asked his own
questions of witnesses. 94 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawaii noted that
a trial judge has the right to examine witnesses to elicit pertinent
material facts not brought out by either party or to clarify testimony.
Such power is incident to the search for truth in judicial proceedings.
At no time, however, must the court assume the role of an advocate
for either party.'
95
Thus, the high court held that the judge acted within his powers when he
engaged in the questioning of witnesses.
Similarly, in Burgess v. Bintz, a pro se defendant objected to the trial judge
questioning witnesses during the defendant's cross-examination of those
witnesses. 197 Reviewing the defendant's petition for habeas corpus relief, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
the questioning of witnesses by the judge was appropriate. 198 In so holding,
the district court noted that the trial judge's questions were "neutrally phrased
and intended to clarify the witness's testimony.'' 99 Further, the court
emphasized the need for the trial judge to be engaged in the trial of a pro se
defendant by quoting the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bollenbach
v. United States that a "'judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of
190. United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 248-49 (6th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
191. Indeed, even in a case where a defendant is represented by counsel, the trial judge may
attempt to ask questions of witnesses when the defense attorney is ineffectively representing his
client. In People v. LaBree, the trial court attempted to compensate for the inadequacies of the
defense counsel by asking questions of witnesses and repeatedly instructing the defense attorney.
313 N.E.2d 730, 731-32 (N.Y. 1974). The Court of Appeals of New York held that "[tihe court's
valiant attempt to cure vital and obvious deficiencies cannot be deemed to satisfy in toto the
constitutional requirement of the assistance of counsel." Id. at 732.
192. Hawaii v. Hutch, 861 P.2d I1, 16 & n.l (Haw. 1993).
193. Id. at 22.
194. Id.
195. Id. at21.
196. Id at 22.
197. Burgess v. Bintz, No. 00 CIV. 8271(DLC), 2002 WL 727011, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24,
2002).
198. Id.
199. Id.
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the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and determining
questions of law.' oo
A judge presiding over a pro se criminal trial may help the defendant comply
with complex evidentiary and procedural rules because pro se defendants may
not have adequate knowledge or skill to ensure that all relevant evidence is
considered by a jury. Thus, a pro se defendant might not be aware of the
significance that asking certain questions may have. In Burgess, the defendant
successfully argued that an encounter with the police several days prior to the
charged crime was irrelevant to the proceedings and should not be introduced
at trial.20 1 The court held that the prosecution could not ask any questions
about this encounter unless the defendant "opened the door to such
testimony." 2°2 An attorney familiar with procedural rules would studiously
avoid asking any questions that would lead to answers relating to the
defendant's encounter with police. In Burgess, however, the pro se defendant
cross-examined one of the police officers and proceeded to "ask[] a series of
questions that the court ruled opened the door to testimony about the
[previous] encounter." 203
In addition, a pro se defendant, unaware of the types of questions to ask on
direct or cross-examination, may ask questions of a witness that result in
irrelevant testimony entering the record. In Commonwealth v. Jackson, the
defendant was charged with armed robbery, armed assault, and assault and
battery. 204  The defendant elected to represent himself.205  In his cross-
examination of the victim, the defendant asked open-ended questions, which206
resulted in answers that implicated the defendant. Thus, in response to the
defendant's vague and general questions, the victim testified that the defendant
had committed the crime.207
An experienced defense attorney would know not to ask open-ended
questions of the victim on the stand like the ones posed by the defendant in this
case. Indeed, the prosecution used this statement in the trial as evidence of the
defendant's guilt.2°8 Although the defendant protested such use, the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts noted that "[w]hile the victim's responses were
damaging to the defendant, they were responsive to the wide-open questions
the defendant employed on cross-examination. [Thus, it was appropriate for
the prosecutor to] argue this evidence in his summation." 209
200. Id. (quoting Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946)).
201. Id at*1.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 647 N.E.2d 401, 403 (Mass. 1995).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 403 n.2.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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Even if the questions are appropriate and designed to elicit relevant, helpful
testimony, a pro se defendant's questions may not be clear to either the witness
or the jury. In Burgess, Brown, and Jackson, the judge repeatedly stepped in to
ask 2questions of the witnesses to clarify what the defendant was attempting to
ask. As the Tenth Circuit noted in United States v. Wheeler, "[t]he trial
judge is allowed to participate in a trial and ask questions of witnesses in order
to ascertain the facts., 211 However, when a pro se defendant's questions are
unclear, the trial judge must first ascertain what testimony the defendant is
trying to elicit, then clarify that with the defendant, and finally ask the question
of the witness. This back and forth draws out the questioning and can confuse
the jury, undermining the defendant's examination.
Further, a defendant may not be aware of courtroom protocol, or when to ask
questions. In Brown, the defendant continually interrupted the prosecution's
questioning of witnesses, interjecting his own questions throughout. 21 2 The
judge had to repeatedly instruct the defendant on the proper time for
questioning of a witness.
213
Even if the questions asked by the defendant are relevant, clear, and made at
the proper time, the defendant may not know to object to inappropriate
questioning by the prosecution. In Grubbs, the prosecution took advantage of
the defendant's pro se status by asking questions that elicited inadmissible
testimony.2 14  As the Supreme Court of Indiana noted in reversing the
defendant's conviction, although the prosecution "chose to bring out matters
which were clearly inadmissible and which would tend to enrage the jury
215
against the accused," the defendant failed to make a single objection at trial.
While the trial judge stepped in several times to limit the prosecution's
questioning, the failure of the defendant to make objections and participate
effectively in the adversarial process led to the admission of prejudicial and
216irrelevant testimony.
210. See Burgess v. Bintz, No. 00 CIV. 8271(DLC), 2002 WL 727011, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
24, 2002); Brown v. State, No. A-8827, 2007 WL 2143010, at *7-10 (Alaska Ct. App. July 25,
2007); Jackson, 647 N.E.2d at 403-05.
211. United States v. Wheeler, 444 F.2d 385, 390 (10th Cir. 1971) (the court went on to note
that the judge "cannot show hostility toward one side or become an advocate for one side").
212. Brown, 2007 WL 2143010, at *7.
213. Id. at*7-9.
214. Grubbs v. State, 265 N.E.2d 40, 42-43 (Ind. 1970).
215. Id. The court also noted:
[T]estimony elicited by the prosecutor as part of his case in chief from the witness
Ratcliffwas clearly inadmissible as irrelevant. This testimony is totally unrelated to the
elements of the offense of which the defendant was charged. The same witness related
a general conversation, the content of which supports the State's case only by innuendo
and suggestion, and at no time specified who said what to whom, but continually
referred only to what "they said."
Id. at43.
216. Id. at42-43.
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In addition to problems related to the questioning of witnesses, a pro se
defendant may also inadvertently allow evidence to enter the record that would
not be introduced by an effective defense attorney. In State v. Kerns, the pro
se defendant put at issue the adequacy of his investigator.2 17 The trial judge
then questioned the defendant on the details of his investigation. 18 In addition
to putting the details of his investigation at issue, the defendant also sought to
interview a witness he believed could provide exculpatory information. The
defendant informed the judge of his desire to question this witness, but noted
that he would not be able to speak with his investigator for a few days. The
judge then asked the prosecutor to find and interview the defense witness in
order to determine what information he may have had about the defendant's
participation in the crime. 2 1 On appeal, the defendant argued that he should
not have been forced to disclose his defense strategy in open court, nor should
the judge have allowed the prosecution to find and interview a defense
witness. The appellate court rejected these arguments, essentially holding
that the defendant had created the circumstances that led to both of these
223
situations at trial. Because the defendant raised the issue of his
investigator's inadequacy, and because the defendant raised the possibility of a
witness having exculpatory information, the appellate court held that the trial
court had acted correctly in ordering disclosure of the defendant's investigation
details and the prosecution's interview of a defense witness.
224
A defendant might not even realize he is raising an issue or providing
evidence to the court when he represents himself. In United States v. Pinkey,
the pro se defendant was charged with mail fraud.225  The defendant was
accused of having sent handwritten letters from prison to several women,
falsely informing them that their deceased husbands owed him money.2 26 In
the course of the court's voir dire of potential jurors, the defendant handwrote
several questions that he wanted the judge to ask of the jury pool. 27 He then
gave the judge the paper containing the handwritten questions. 28 The judge,
in turn, gave the prosecution the handwritten questions to use as a handwriting
217. State v. Kems, No. I CA-CR 05-0821, 2007 WL 5200167, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug.
14, 2007).
218. Id.
219. Id. at *4.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at *1-2, *4.
223. Id. at *3-4.
224. Id.
225. United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 306 (10th Cir. 1977).
226. Id. at 306-07.
227. Id. at 307.
228. Id.
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sample to compare to the letters at issue in the case. 229  An experienced
attorney would likely have gone to great efforts to avoid providing a
handwriting sample to the prosecution, where the identification of the
defendant's handwriting was at issue. A defendant representing himself,
however, would not likely know of the consequences of providing handwritten
voir dire questions to the judge.
Adherence to rigid procedural and evidentiary rules and strict courtroom
protocol places a defendant at an extreme disadvantage when he represents
himself at trial. A defendant unfamiliar with these rules and untrained in the
law is often not able to adequately elicit relevant testimony, object to
inappropriate questioning, or avoid raising prejudicial issues. Thus, the
fairness of the adversarial system breaks down when the rules in place to
ensure a fair contest are not effectively utilized or enforced. In addition to the
pro se defendant's inability to effectively abide by procedural rules, the role of
a defendant in a pro se criminal trial is often problematic.
Thus, because of the complex evidentiary and procedural rules inherent to
the American adversarial system of justice, judges may step in to ensure that
the defendant's story is told and that strict evidentiary rules do not prevent
relevant evidence from being presented to a jury. Judges may relax procedural
rules and allow pro se defendants leeway in introducing relevant evidence, in
order to ensure that all material facts are presented to the jury. In this way, the
importance of strict procedural and evidentiary requirements of an adversarial
system is lessened, and the cases involving pro se litigants begin to take on
characteristics that resemble that of an inquisitorial system. As previously
discussed, inquisitorial systems of justice are focused less on adherence to
rigid procedural requirements and the procedural rights of the defendants, and
more on substantive rights and an ultimate determination of the truth.
Similarly, in adversarial trials involving pro se defendants, adherence to
procedural rules may be relaxed in order to allow a defendant to present
relevant material facts to the jury.
C. The Defendant's Role at Trial
Finally, the defendant's role at trial changes when he opts to represent
himself. In a typical adversarial trial, the only time a defendant is able to tell
his side of the story, in his own words, is if he elects to take the stand and
testify on his own behalf. Defendants have a constitutional right to avoid self-
incrimination; however, if a defendant wishes to explain his version of the
events he must be willing to testify under oath, thereby subjecting himself to
cross-examination, impeachment, and perjury charges should he lie in his
testimony. By only permitting defendants to speak to the finder of fact under
these circumstances, the adversarial system attempts to ensure that a
defendant's trial is based on facts and evidence in the record, and not on a false
229. See id.
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tale spun by a defendant to convince the jury of his innocence. Yet, when a
defendant represents himself, these norms are turned on end.
As previously discussed, a defendant in an inquisitorial trial is encouraged to
participate in the proceedings. 230  In the French inquisitorial system,
defendants may testify but are not placed under oath when they do testify.23'
Thus, defendants in the French inquisitorial system are able to present their
account of events to the finder of fact without being subject to perjury charges
should the prosecution think that the defendant lied on the stand.
Much like in the French inquisitorial system, in the United States, an
unsworn pro se defendant can address a finder of fact directly. 232 By speaking
directly to the jury in both his opening statements and closing arguments, a
defendant is essentially able to testify while not under oath. Although a judge
can instruct a defendant to only discuss evidence that is raised at trial, jurors
may not be able to differentiate between the testimony of witnesses on the
stand, who are under oath and subject to cross-examination, and the statements
of the defendants in his opening statement and closing argument, which are
accompanied by neither of these safeguards. This ability to testify directly to
the finder of fact without being under oath represents yet another way in which
a pro se criminal trial in the United States takes on characteristics of a French
inquisitorial trial.
In addition to the problems associated with a defendant's ability to present
his narrative directly to the jury, difficulties can also arise when a pro se
defendant decides to take the stand in his own defense. In United States v.
Nivica, the pro se defendant declared his intention to take the stand and testify
on his own behalf.233 The defendant, Mark Wellington, requested that his
standby counsel be permitted to ask him questions, but the judge refused.234
The judge stated that because the defendant had elected to proceed pro se, he
would have to ask himself questions on the stand and then respond to those
235questions with an answer. This led to the following direct testimony:
MR. WELLINGTON: The question is: Does Mark Pedley
Wellington, a/k/a Jack Williams, have anything to hide?
The answer is No.
[PROSECUTOR]: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained. Please strike the answer. Please wait
until an objection is made, if any is made, before you answer.
MR. WELLINGTON: Well, I guess I can't ask myself any more
questions then.
230. See supra Part II.B.3.
231. See supra Part II.B.3.
232. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984).
233. United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d I 110, 1120 (1st Cir. 1989).
234. Id.
235. Id.
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THE COURT: Thank you. You are excused.2 36
Because of his clear confusion regarding the rules attendant to questioning
witnesses and the difficulty of asking oneself questions on the stand, the
defendant was effectively prevented from testifying on his own behalf. Yet
even if a pro se defendant is able to effectively question himself, or if standby
counsel is permitted to conduct the questioning, the change in role from
advocate to witness may confuse the jury and undermine the defendant's
credibility on the stand.
Thus, the right of a defendant to represent himself in the adversarial criminal
justice system of the United States creates numerous dilemmas for the trial
judge, prosecutor, and defense attorneys involved. Without the assistance of
the judge and prosecutors relating to evidentiary issues, examination of
witnesses, jury instructions, and opening and closing statements, a defendant
will have difficulty conducting a successful defense. For these reasons, courts
and scholars have criticized the right to self-representation as being ineffective,
difficult to administer, and ultimately unfair.23 '
Despite the problems and criticism associated with the right to self-
representation, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the right time and time again,
and defendants continue to exercise their right to self-representation and
proceed pro se in criminal trials. However, the Supreme Court cases
interpreting the right to self-representation seem to focus on the ability of a
defendant to assert this right, rather than whether the right itself furthers the
interests of justice in an adversarial system or how to conduct trials in which a
defendant represents himself. Except to note that the Constitution does not
"require judges to take over chores for a pro se defendant that would normally
be attended to by trained counsel as a matter of course," the Court has not
acknowledged that these cases are any different than cases in which a
defendant is represented by counsel.
238
Yet pro se criminal trials can take on characteristics more akin to an
inquisitorial system of justice than to an adversarial trial. Judges in the United
States may elect to resolve some of the problems presented by a pro se
defendant by adopting procedures that resemble those used in the inquisitorial
system. In this way, judges could attempt to compensate for the imbalance
created when one party is unrepresented in an adversarial system by seeking
the truth though measures other than a pure contest between two fairly
matched parties.
This merger of distinct systems of justice is the result of American courts
attempting to ensure the fairness of proceedings when a criminal defendant
chooses to represent himself. The American adversarial system of criminal
justice relies on the judge as a neutral and detached umpire-presiding over a
236. Id.
237. See Hashimoto, supra note 143, at 434.
238. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 184 (1984).
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trial but not a proactive participant in the proceedings. A judge's typical role is
a passive one: he reacts to issues and situations presented but does not
affirmatively enter the process.2 39 However, the American system of criminal
justice is also premised on the idea that two adversaries, pitted against each
other and bound by strict procedural rules in a trial setting, is the most effective
means of determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Such a system
may indeed be effective should each adversary be trained in the strict
procedural rules and knowledgeable about the rules guiding courtroom
conduct. However, when one of those adversaries is significantly
disadvantaged, the effectiveness of determining guilt or innocence is severely
hampered. In such situations, a judge may take on a much more proactive and
assertive role, instructing the disadvantaged defendant on rights and rules, and
even taking a part in the presentation of evidence to the jury, through witness
questioning and sua sponte rulings. In this way, an American adversarial
criminal trial begins to look more like a civil-law inquisitorial trial, with a
proactive judge and a determination to find guilt as a matter of empirical truth,
rather than as the outcome of a contest between two parties.
240
IV. ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-
REPRESENTATION
In trials outside of the United States, where defendants have been given the
right to represent themselves, problems have arisen that are similar to those
experienced in the American system. In the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the question of a defendant's right to self-
representation was argued and debated in the case of Slobodan Milo~evi&24
Milogevi6 was tried before the tribunal for crimes against humanity committed
during his presidencies of Serbia and Yugoslavia. 242  At the outset of the
proceedings, Milogevi6 asserted the right to represent himself 2 43 The trial
chamber determined that the statute authorizing the ICTY allowed a defendant
to opt to represent himself 244  The trial chamber also decided that the
239. See JOHNSON & WOLFE, supra note 99, at 71.
240. For an interesting article advocating a more engaged role for judges in civil pro se cases,
see Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and Those of
the Appearance of Neutrality when Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations,
and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423 (2004).
241. See Milogevid v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, paras. 11-13
(Nov. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Milogevi6 Appeal Decision]; Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-
02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defense Counsel, paras. 31-36 (Sept. 22, 2004)
[hereinafter Milo~evid Counsel Decision].
242. Milo~evid Appeal Decision, supra note 241, para. 2.
243. Id. para. 3.
244. Milogevi6 Counsel Decision, supra note 241 (cited in Daryl A. Mundis, Current
Developments at the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, I J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 703, 709-
10 & n.51 (2003)).
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proceedings in front of the ICTY were of an adversarial nature, "and
adversarial-unlike inquisitorial-systems do not impose defence counsel
upon an accused who does not want one." 245 Finally, the tribunal concluded
that imposing unwanted counsel on Milogevid would be tantamount to denying
him the ability to defend himself.246 The trial chamber held that the right to
self-representation was not unlimited, however, and reserved the right to later
revisit the issue.
247
The trial that ensued following the ruling was heavily criticized by many in
the international legal community. 248 Milogevi6 continually disrupted the trial
and there were lengthy delays because of Milogevi6's illness and resulting
inability to advocate on his own behalf.249 Milogevi's main defense at trial
was not that he did not commit the acts, but rather that the tribunal had no
authority over him as the former leader of Yugoslavia. 25  Such a defense
necessarily disrupted the proceedings, because Milogevi6 refused to properly
counter charges against him and instead used the advocate's seat as a platform
to contest his detention and prosecution.
In September 2004, the tribunal reconsidered its earlier determination and
ordered that Milogevi6 be represented by counsel for the remainder of the
proceedings against him. 25' The tribunal formally based its decision on the
constant disruptions caused by Milogevi6's illnesses and the fear that the trial
would never conclude at the present pace. 252 As the tribunal stated:
If at any stage of a trial there is a real prospect that it will be
disrupted and the integrity of the trial undermined with the risk that it
245. Daryl A. Mundis, Current Developments at the Ad Hoc International Criminal
Tribunals, I J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 703, 710 (2003) (citing Milotevi6 Counsel Decision, supra note
241, para. 18).
246. Milogevi6 Counsel Decision, supra note 241, para. 24 (cited in Mundis, supra note 245,
at 710).
247. Id. para. 40 (cited in Mundis, supra note 245, at 710).
248. See Edieth Y. Wu, Global Responses and Recourses to Terrorism, 25 WHITIER L. REV.
521, 534 (2004) (noting that critics found the trial to be "more '[w]estern than international'
(quoting Justice is on Trial, OBSERVER (London, U.K.), Feb. 17, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.
uk/news/2002/feb/17/leaders.warcrimes/print) (alteration in original)); David Scheffer, Op-Ed,
The Hague War Crimes Tribunal: Enough of Milosevic's Antics, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 13,
2004, at A7 (noting that "Uj]ustice for the people and for the defendant simply is not well served
when the right of self-representation is abused").
249. Transcript of Record at 32,357-59, Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54 (Sept. 2,
2004) [hereinafter Milogevi6 Transcript] (statement of Robinson, J.) ("[T]he trial was interrupted
over a dozen times on account of the ill health of the accused, thereby losing some 66 trial
days.").
250. Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case. No. IT-02-04 (Nov. 8, 2001) (cited in Adam Isaac
Hasson, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity on Trial: Noriega, Pinochet, and
Milosevic-Trends in Political Accountability and Transnational Criminal Law, 25 B.C. INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 125, 153 (2002)).
251. See Milogevi6 Transcript, supra note 249, at 32,391 (Sept. 2, 2004).
252. See id. at 32,358.
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will not be conducted fairly, then the Trial Chamber has a duty to put
in place a regime which will avoid that. Should self-representation
have that impact, we conclude that it is open to the Trial Chamber to
assign counsel to conduct the defence case, if the Accused will not
appoint his own counsel.253
On November 1, 2004, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY released a decision
based on an interlocutory appeal filed by the appointed defense counsel. 4
Milogevi6 refused to cooperate with his designated counsel, and so defense
counsel requested that the appellate body review the tribunal's decision to
appoint counsel for the defendant, arguing that they could not provide an
effective defense without the defendant's cooperation. 255 In its decision, the
appeals chamber laid out a clear test for determining whether a defendant may256
proceed to represent himself before the tribunal. After stating that a
defendant had the right to represent himself, the appeals chamber held that this
"right may be curtailed on the grounds that a defendant's self-representation is
substantially and persistently obstructing the proper and expeditious conduct of
his trial. 25  The appeals chamber then held that it was appropriate for counsel
to be appointed to represent Milogevi6, but when Milogevid was physically
capable of representing himself he must be allowed to do so. 25 8 Thus, despite
the numerous delays and tactics on the part of the defendant, which attacked
the legitimacy of the ICTY, the appeals chamber still maintained that
Milogevi6 was able to represent himself, displaying the strength of the doctrine
of self-representation.
In another trial before the ICTY, Vojislav Segelj also asserted the right to
self-representation. 259 Segelj was a Yugoslav political leader, as well as a law
professor at the University of Belgrade, who was accused of crimes against
humanity.26° The trial chamber determined that the right to self-representation
253. Milogevi6 Counsel Decision, supra note 241, para. 33.
254. Milogevid Appeal Decision, supra note 241.
255. See Scharf, supra note 5.
256. Milogevid Appeal Decision, supra note 241, paras. 11-13.
257. Id. para. 13.
258. Id. paras. 19-21.
259. Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for
Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Segelj with His Defence, para. 2 (May 9, 2003)
[hereinafter Segelj Counsel Decision].
260. See Prosecutor v. egelj, Indictment, paras. 1-3, 17 (Jan. 15, 2003). The indictment
contained allegations that, among other things:
On 23 February 1991, Vojislav SESELJ was appointed President of the newly founded
"Serbian Radical Party" ("SRS"). In June 1991, he was elected a member of the
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. In almost daily rallies and election campaigns, he
called for Serb unity and war against Serbia's "historic enemies", namely the ethnic
Croat, Muslim and Albanian populations within the territories of the former
Yugoslavia. Additional relevant historical and political facts are set out in Annex I to
this indictment.
Id. para. 4.
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was not unlimited, under the "ICTY and ICTR Statutes, national practice,
relevant human rights norms and the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals." 26 1
The judges then expressed serious concerns about allowing the defendant to
represent himself in front of the tribunal:
Notwithstanding the assertions of the accused that he would use
'legal arguments and hard facts' to 'defeat' the Tribunal, the Trial
Chamber noted that 'good cause for concern' has been shown, based
on the prosecution's arguments and throughout the initial
proceedings in the case, where the accused 'is in fact increasingly
demonstrating a tendency to act in an obstructionist fashion while at
the same time revealing a need for legal assistance'.
262
The tribunal ultimately provided Segelj with standby counsel to assist in his
representation and prevent significant disruption of the proceedings.263
Nor are these problems confined to the ICTY. An Israeli court tried Marwan
Barghouti for, among other things, membership in a terrorist organization,
terrorist activity, murder, and attempted murder. Barghouti is a Palestinian
who was then the Secretary General of Fatah.265 Although Barghouti was
initially represented by a team of experienced defense attorneys, he chose to
266
represent himself at trial. The Israeli court attempted to appoint the Israeli
public defenders to represent Barghouti, but Barghouti declined any such
assistance.
267
Barghouti made no secret of the reasoning behind his position.
He stressed that his decision to forego any trial defense was adopted
after careful consultation with his privately retained attorneys. He
emphasized that he held no personal resentment against the public
defenders who were prepared to assist him. Nevertheless, he
explained that he regarded the [Office of the Public Defender] as an
extension of the occupying powers of the State of Israel.268
Like Milogevi6, Barghouti was not interested in contesting the criminal charges
against him as much as he was determined to challenge the legitimacy of the
proceedings. "He wanted to portray himself as a political prisoner and a
261. Mundis & Gaynor, supra note 152, at 664.
262. Id. at 665 (quoting Segelj Counsel Decision, supra note 259, paras. 22-23) (footnotes
omitted).
263. See Segelj Counsel Decision, supra note 259, para. 7.
264. CrimC (TA) 092134/02 Israel v. Barghouti [2002], available at Isr. Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, State of Israel vs Marwan Barghouti (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.mfa.gov.i/mfa/
mfaarchive/2000_2009/2002/12/; see also Kenneth Mann & David Weiner, Creating a Public
Defender System in the Shadow of the Israeli - Palestinian Conflict, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 91,
115-16 (2003).
265. Mann & Weiner, supra note 264, at 115.
266. Seeid.at118.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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martyr, unjustly prosecuted by an immoral legal system. He did not want his
trial to look like a fair proceeding." 269 The court insisted that Barghouti be
represented by the public defenders assigned to his case, placing his counsel in
the difficult situation of representing a defendant who did not desire
representation. The public defenders decided to remain passive at trial, in
order to best respect their client's wishes.270  This led to the Israeli judges
assuming a more proactive role in the proceedings.
"Uncharacteristically, they abandoned their attitude of moderate aloofness
toward the parties and adopted a critical, if not suspicious, posture toward the
prosecution. The judges were constantly interrupting the prosecutor with
questions from the bench, openly expressing their doubts about certain parts of
the evidence." 271 Thus, although the Israeli system of justice is an adversarial
system, just as in the United States, when a defendant chooses to represent
himself for political reasons the judges may begin to take on characteristics
similar to those exhibited by judges in inquisitorial systems.
In the Special Court for Sierra Leone, defendant Sam Hinga Norman
asserted the right to represent himself at trial after dispensing with a team of
private trial attorneys. Norman, who was Sierra Leone's Minister of the
Interior Affairs at the time, was charged with crimes against humanity and war
crimes. 273 The judges of the Court rejected, in part, Norman's request by
appointing standby counsel to represent him.274 In making this determination,
the court took into consideration that Norman was being tried jointly with
other defendants, the lateness of his request to represent himself, and finally
the fact that the right to self-representation is not an unqualified right.
275
In none of the aforementioned cases did the courts or tribunals deny the
defendant a right to self-representation. Nor did the courts revoke such a right
entirely, even on significant disruption by the defendant. Rather, the courts
limited the defendant's ability to represent himself by appointing standby or
amicus curiae counsel, limiting the defendant's right to self-representation but
not denying it entirely.
Thus, the issues that arise in the United States when a defendant chooses to
represent himself also arise in international arenas when a defendant is granted
269. Id. at 119-20.
270. See id. at 121.
271. Id.
272. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on the Application of
Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation, para. 4 (June 8, 2004) [hereinafter Norman Self-
Representation Decision]; see also Simon Meisenberg, The Right to Self Representation Before
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, BOFAXE, June 19, 2004, http://www.ithv.rub.de/imperia/md/
content/publications/bofaxe/2004/x273e.pdf.
273. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-03-08-PT-002, Indictment, para. 2 (Mar. 7,
2003).
274. Norman Self-Representation Decision, supra note 272, para. 32.
275. Id. paras. 25-27.
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the right to proceed without an attorney. As an increasing number of trials
with international and political components are brought in courts of law, the
issue of self-representation is assuming a greater international characteristic.
While most countries do not allow a defendant the unconditional right of self-
representation, international tribunals seem to be adopting more features of
adversarial systems, including the right to self-representation. Trials with a
political component, however, can be particularly problematic when the right
to self-representation is invoked. Thus, courts in the United States or abroad,
where defendants are granted the right to represent themselves, need to adopt
procedures to ensure fairness, consistency, and accuracy of verdicts. Perhaps
the best place to start is to look at what judges are already doing to ensure the
fairness of pro se criminal trials. Inquisitorial procedures allow a judge more
control over criminal proceedings in which a defendant represents himself, and
better ensure accuracy of result. Finding ways of consistently incorporating
these practices in all pro se criminal trials would help ensure the fairness of the
proceedings and the outcomes.
V. ENSURING THE FAIRNESS OF TRIALS IN WHICH A DEFENDANT REPRESENTS
HIMSELF
Adversarial trials are a contest between two sides: if the government wins,
the accused is found guilty; if the defendant wins, he is acquitted. Proponents
of the adversarial system argue that a system pitting two adversaries against
each other in a court of law is the best way to determine the guilt or innocence
of the party charged. However, because of the contest-like atmosphere of an
adversarial system, rules must be in place to ensure that the outcome is fair.
Thus, the adversarial system relies on strict compliance with procedural rules
and zealous advocacy by all representatives to preserve fairness and ensure that
justice prevails.
Defendants who choose to represent themselves are often incapable of
asserting control over the proceedings and conforming with the procedural
rules essential to an adversarial system. Thus, pro se criminal trials jeopardize
the ability of the adversarial system to fairly determine guilt or innocence.
However, as noted in Part I of this Article, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
reaffirmed the constitutional status of the right of self-representation. Thus, in
order to consistently resolve the conflicting ideals of fairness and autonomy in
pro se criminal trials, standards need to be adopted to guide courts and ensure
the constitutional rights of the defendant are not violated. In developing these
standards, it is natural to determine what some courts are already doing to
ensure the fairness of proceedings in cases in which a defendant has chosen to
represent himself.
As discussed in Part III of this Article, some judges have adopted procedures
that resemble those used in the inquisitorial system to assert greater control
over pro se criminal trials and ensure the admission of relevant evidence. This
transformation is a natural evolution of an adversarial trial when one of the
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parties is not able to adequately defend his rights. By asserting greater control
over the proceedings and ensuring the admission of probative evidence,
regardless of strict compliance with evidentiary rules, judges ensure that the
outcome of such a trial is fairer and more likely to result in an accurate verdict.
Yet not all judges engage in more proactive behavior in pro se criminal trials.
Consistency between courtrooms is essential to the legitimacy of any system
of justice. A defendant tried in one courtroom should not have a significant
advantage over a defendant tried in another courtroom, merely because he is in
front of a different judge. The same strict adherence to procedural and
evidentiary rules that ensure the fairness of proceedings also ensures
consistency of outcome. This assumes, however, that procedural and
evidentiary rules are being effectively litigated in all courtrooms. Yet when a
defendant represents himself it is unlikely that he is competently asserting
control over the trial process and effectively utilizing procedural rules. If in
one courtroom the judge takes greater control over the proceedings and ensures
the admission of probative evidence, and in another courtroom the judge
refuses to relinquish his role as a detached and neutral arbiter, the result will be
inconsistency. Thus, courts need procedures to ensure that trials of pro se
defendants are consistent among different courts.
If recommendations were in place that encouraged all judges to become
more proactive in criminal trials and adopt the procedures used by some judges
to ensure a fairer outcome, the trials of self-represented defendants would
arguably be more consistent and lead to more just verdicts. The power to
assert greater control over the trial through added participation, enhanced
questioning, and less strict adherence to procedural and evidentiary rules is
already in the hands of the judge. Indeed, as already discussed, some judges
are currently utilizing these powers to ensure pro se criminal trials lead to fair
and accurate verdicts. Guidelines are needed to encourage this proactive
behavior and provide direction for judges on how to more actively engage in
pro se criminal trials without abandoning their neutrality.
Such recommendations have already been made and adopted in the civil
arena in cases involving pro se civil litigants. Scholars studying civil
proceedings involving pro se litigants have long noted the unfairness that can
result from such trials, and have argued for the adoption of reforms involving
inquisitorial practices.276 These reforms include a more proactive role for
judges in pro se litigation, including questioning initiated by judges, and
276. E.g., Baldacci, supra note 125, at 691 (noting that "defenses of the adversarial system
against incursions of inquisitorial-based reforms are rooted in the adversarial system's
presumption that a zealous lawyer will represent each side in a case"); Rebecca A. Albrecht et al.,
Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants, JUDGE'S J., Winter 2003, at
16 (suggesting "options for trial judges seeking helpful techniques" for those appearing pro se).
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relaxed evidentiary and procedural rules.277 Indeed, the American Judicature
Society has issued recommendations that seem to advocate for the adoption of
inquisitorial practices by judges presiding over pro se civil trials. Among the
recommended procedures, the Society recommends:
1. Courts should provide self-represented litigants with information
and services to enable them to use the court, and courts should secure
the resources and staffing to provide those services.
7. Judges should assure that self-represented litigants in the
courtroom have the opportunity to meaningfully present their case.
Judges should have the authority to insure that procedural and
evidentiary rules are not used to unjustly hinder the legal interests of
self-represented litigants.
8. All Courts should assist judges in managing cases involving self-
represented litigants.
278
The Society further explains that judges could assist pro se litigants by
"directly question[ing] witnesses for pro se litigants more frequently than for
those represented by counsel, and be[ing] more lenient in the content of
opening and closing statements." 279 Based on these recommendations, some
civil courts have adopted practices mimicking those used in inquisitorial
systems in order to accommodate pro se litigation without undermining the
faimess of the proceedings. A similar strategy should be used in the criminal
arena, where the stakes are higher and the right of the defendant to a fair trial
all the more important.
Recommendations for judges overseeing criminal trials where defendants
represent themselves would allow for greater consistency among courts and
encourage judges to be more proactive in the trial than in typical criminal
277. Baldacci, supra note 125, at 693. Scholars have not argued for the wholesale adoption
of inquisitorial practices in pro se litigation, rather they have argued that the adoption of some
inquisitorial-like procedures would better ensure the fairness of the proceedings.
To gain the benefits of independent, judicial questioning during trial, we need not
replace purely adversarial evidence gathering with the judge-dominated model of the
inquisitorial system. An acceptable middle ground could be the same allocation of
interrogating power employed during our voir dire.... [T]he judge might conduct the
initial interrogation, after which the attorneys would be free to probe for additional
details.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA
FOR TRIAL REFORM 256 (1994)).
278. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, supra note 36, at 1, 5.
279. Id. at 4. In explaining these recommendations, the American Judicature Society noted
that "[m]any judges currently use individual strategies for handling pro se litigants, but there
appears to be no uniformity among judges and courts on managing these cases. Judges need
guidance on the most effective and ethically permissible strategies for managing litigation
involving self-represented litigants." Id. at 4-5.
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proceedings. In adopting these recommendations, courts could look to
practices used in inquisitorial systems and mimicked by some courts
overseeing pro se criminal and civil trials in the United States. Thus, the
recommendations should include the following provisions:
" Courts presiding over criminal trials in which defendants represent
themselves should provide those defendants with resources and
information allowing them to better understand and navigate the
trial proceedings.
" Courts should ensure that self-represented defendants have the
opportunity to meaningfully present their case by ensuring that the
issues and arguments made at trial are defined and clarified at the
outset of the proceedings.
* Courts should ensure that self-represented defendants are able to
present relevant evidence to the finder of fact, and should not allow
strict adherence to procedural and evidentiary rules to unjustly
prevent defendants from presenting an effective defense.
" Courts should assist self-represented defendants in asking questions
of witnesses when necessary to clarify or elicit relevant testimony.
" Courts should ensure that the rights of self-represented litigants are
protected by preventing irrelevant and prejudicial information from
being presented to the jury, regardless of whether the defendant
objects to the admittance of such testimony.
* Courts should instruct the jury that any questioning done by the
court in the course of the trial does not reflect the court's opinion on
the evidence in the case, nor the guilt of the defendant.
" Courts should further instruct the jury that any statements made by
the defendant while not on the stand (including the defendant's
opening statement and closing argument) are not made under oath,
and should not be considered evidence in the case.
These recommendations, similar to those advanced by the American Judicature
Society for civil cases, would help ensure consistency and accuracy in criminal
prosecutions where a defendant elects to proceed without counsel.
In order to effectively implement these recommendations, judges will need
to be better informed of the arguments that will be made in the case prior to its
commencement. For a judge to ensure that a witness is effectively questioned,
either in direct testimony or cross-examination, he must first understand what
the goal of such questioning is. In the French inquisitorial system, the judge is
able to effectively control the proceedings and question witnesses because he is
informed of all issues, facts, and witnesses at the outset of the proceedings
through a dossier. In the American adversarial system, a judge will need to be
similarly informed of the issues in a criminal case in order to effectively
control the proceedings and ensure that relevant testimony is elicited from
witnesses by the pro se defendant. Rather than discovering the issues and facts
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of a case as the jury is discovering them, a judge in a pro se criminal trial
would be better able to ensure the fairness of the proceedings by knowing in
advance what to expect from the prosecution and the defense. Thus, as an
essential component of these recommendations, judges should be able to
request and receive information prior to trial that will allow the court to be
more proactive in the proceedings. At some point before the commencement
of a pro se criminal trial, a judge should receive from the prosecution and
defense the arguments that will be made at the proceedings. Further, both
sides should provide the court with a list of witnesses who will be called at
trial, and the testimony that will be elicited from those witnesses. In this way,
a judge will be better able to effectuate the recommendations listed above.
Further, the judge would need to be particularly careful to maintain his
neutrality as he asserts control over the proceedings and asks witnesses
questions. A judge need not abandon his neutrality when he affirmatively
participates in a criminal trial. Indeed, "[j]udges in inquisitorial systems
engage in a mandated active role without a loss of impartiality." 280 But judges
do need to ensure that their participation in the trial does not convey a bias for
either side. In order to do this, judges should ask questions designed to elicit
relevant information, without conveying opinions on witness credibility or the
weight of the evidence. Perhaps the best way to ensure this neutrality without
inhibiting a judge from asking questions is to allow a judge to ask preliminary
questions of each witness, designed to elicit relevant testimony. This
questioning can be followed by questioning from the prosecution and defense.
But in this way, the judge will help the finder of fact by ensuring that it has all
the relevant information before it, without commenting on the reliability of the
evidence or betraying a bias for either side.
Thus, with careful oversight and consistent use, recommendations
advocating the use of inquisitorial practices by criminal trial courts would
better ensure that pro se criminal proceedings lead to fair and accurate verdicts.
Without the adoption of such recommendations, the current practices of courts
will lead to unfair and inconsistent results.
Because the adversary system is a contest between two sides, if a competent
defendant chooses to put forth his own defense, even one that has little hope in
succeeding on the merits, that is his choice as an autonomous participant in the
process. The Supreme Court has held that as long as defendants abide by the
rules of court and remain within the bounds of the law, they have the right to
present their own defense. Indeed, in some rare cases a defendant is in the best
position to defend himself at trial. However, while self-representation is a
fundamental right in the American adversarial system, trials involving pro se
defendants can lead to inefficiency and injustice.
280. Paris R. Baldacci, A Full and Fair Hearing: The Role of the ALJ in Assisting the Pro Se
Litigant, 27 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 447, 492-93 (2007).
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Perhaps the best option in such cases is to look to the inquisitorial system of
justice for a model of how to proceed. A judge who assumes a more proactive
role in the trial of a pro se defendant would be better able to keep the
proceedings moving forward and avoid unnecessary delays. A defendant
would still be able to speak his mind in statements made to the court and in
response to questioning by the judge, but the defendant would not be directing
the timing or manner of the proceedings, like lawyers are able to do in typical
adversarial proceedings.281 Further, this type of trial would not require the
defendant to be familiar with technical evidentiary or procedural rules, because
the judge would be permitted a more proactive role in examining witnesses,
clarifying and admitting evidence, and requesting further investigation. A
judge need not abandon his neutral role in order to take a more active role in
the proceedings. Indeed, a more involved judicial officer seems to be one of
the ways in which the fairness of such proceedings may be preserved. This
model would simply standardize and legitimize the practices that some judges
engage in, to a lesser extent, when ensuring a fair trial by assisting pro se
defendants.
VI. CONCLUSION
The adversarial system of justice is based on a contest between two parties:
the government and the defendant. While the power and resources of the
government are significantly greater than those of an individual defendant,
procedural rules and rights help level the playing field and afford defendants a
better chance to win the contest. These procedural rules and rights are
technical, however, and require the knowledge of an expert in order to be
preserved and asserted to a defendant's advantage. Thus, courts in adversarial
systems, such as in the United States, provide defendants with counsel to guide
them through the proceedings and ensure a just and fair outcome to the trial. It
may then seem that the right to represent oneself is antithetical to the
adversarial system of justice. Indeed, ideals of individual autonomy often
conflict with the desire to ensure a fair trial. Despite this conflict, however, the
Supreme Court of the United States and the judges of several international
tribunals have determined that a defendant's autonomy interests outweigh the
interest of appointing counsel to ensure a fair trial. However, when a
defendant chooses to represent himself, the fairness and even the very
legitimacy of the adversarial system are called into question.
One way to handle this dilemma is to borrow some aspects of inquisitorial
systems that would enable a judge to embrace a more active role in the
proceedings, thereby allowing the defendant a fair trial while still allowing him
281. In addition, the French approach of allowing a defendant to speak without being subject
to threat of perjury charges or impeachment would further encourage such defendants to put
forward the merits of their "political defense" without allowing such arguments to take over and
derail the trial.
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to assert his political position. Such a system would work to ensure that the
public perceives the proceedings as fair while allowing the defendant an
opportunity to put forward his political argument, which, indeed, may be his
only defense.
This transformation of a pro se criminal trial has already occurred in many
courtrooms. This phenomenon is the natural evolution of a criminal trial in
which the defendant chooses to represent himself, and where the efficiency and
fairness of the traditional contest-model of the adversarial system begin to
break down. Rather than ignoring the phenomenon, or allowing it to continue
sporadically in certain courts, recommendations should be adopted that
encourage all courts to ensure the fairness of pro se criminal proceedings. By
looking to inquisitorial systems of justice and borrowing practices that allow
for greater participation of the judge and more relaxed procedural rules in trials
in which a defendant represents himself, the American adversarial system of
justice would help ensure that the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to represent himself does not undermine his fundamental right to a fair trial.
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